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Abstract 
Recent years have proven to be quite progressive in terms of the development 
of anti-corruption legislation, especially with the promulgation of the United 
Kingdom Bribery Act, and the increased enforcement of the United States For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act by US federal prosecutors.  
Although the two mentioned Acts have largely overshadowed the anti-corrup-
tion developments in the BRICS (Federative Republic of Brazil, Russian Feder-
ation, Republic of India, People’s Republic of China and the Republic of South 
Africa) countries, it to some extent raised the profile and initiated develop-
ment.  
The BRICS countries are a grouping of countries understood to be undergoing 
rapid transformation in their economic environments which often leads to sig-
nificant corruption problems, hindering the economic growth that would fur-
ther develop these countries into full force economic super powers. The ap-
parent low impact of the anti-corruption legislation in these countries is con-
cerning despite their commitment and implemented legislative initiatives. 
This thesis will critically and comparatively evaluate the current legislation re-
lating to anti-bribery in the various jurisdictions of the BRICS countries. The 
study aims to clarify the extent of the application of the anti-bribery legislation 
and in doing so develop a greater understanding of the anti-corruption envi-
ronment of the BRICS countries. 
It is necessary to first define the concept of BRICS. Thereafter it will be practi-
cable to define the scope of the definition of corruption for purposes of this 
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evaluation and then evaluate the current state of Brazilian, Russian, Indian, 
Chinese and South African anti-corruption – more specifically bribery – law. 
Through this study I intend to elucidate and contextualise the many provisions 
in the BICS legislative environments.  
The conclusion of this study will allow for parallels to be drawn between the 
anti-bribery legislation in the various BRICS countries, which will provide an 
opportunity to assess the effectiveness of the anti-bribery provisions in the 
various countries. 
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A critical comparative analysis of anti-bribery legislation in the BRICS 
countries 
Can South African law benefit from a critical comparative analysis of anti-cor-
ruption (in particular anti-bribery) legislation in the other BRICS countries? 
1 Introduction 
1 1 Introducing the BRICS 
The concept BRIC was first introduced by Jim O’Neill in 2001 to describe a group of 
economically emerging countries (the Federative Republic of Brazil {Brazil}, Russian 
Federation {Russia}, Republic of India {India}, and People’s Republic of China {Chi-
na}) who, on a purchasing power parity (commonly known as PPP) basis, con-
tributed an aggregate of 23,3% to the world GDP in the year 2000. The Republic of 
South Africa formally joined this group in 2010,  with a combined nominal GDP of US1
$13,7 trillion.   2
It is estimated that by 2027 BRICs (excluding South Africa) countries will overtake 
 SA info reporter “New era as South Africa joins BRICS” SouthAfrican.info (Accessed 2011-04-11) 1
http://www.southafrica.info/global/brics/brics-080411.htm#.UFGijLIgev0; Wilson Dreaming with 
BRICs: The Path to 2050 (Global Economics Paper No: 99) 2003. 
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the G7 countries.  The BRICS are in a similar stage of economic development. This 3
group represents a huge economic power shift from the developed G7 (French Re-
public, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Italian Republic, Japan, the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and 
Canada).  
Therefore it is safe to deduct that these countries’ economic wellbeing is of para-
mount importance to the economic development of the world. 
As Vito Tanzi, the director of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Fiscal Affairs 
Department, argues, two factors may have had an impact on the perceived growth of 
awareness of corruption in recent years: the growth of international trade and busi-
ness and the economic changes that have taken place in many countries and espe-
cially in the economies in transition (like the BRICS).  4
The growth of international trade and business has created many situations in which 
the payment of bribes (often referred to as "commissions") may be highly beneficial 
to the companies that pay them by giving them access to profitable contracts over 
competitors.  Large bribes have been reported to have been paid to get foreign con5 -
tracts or to get privileged access to markets or to particular benefits such as tax in-
centives. World Business of March 4, 1996, reported that the bribes paid abroad by 
 Foroohar R "BRICs Overtake G7 By 2027" Newsweek (Accessed 2012-06-19) http://3
www.newsweek.com/brics-overtake-g7-2027-76001; Wilson Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 
2050 (Global Economics Paper No: 99) 2003.
 Tanzi Corruption around the world: causes, consequences, scope and cures (1998) 559.4
 Baran “Corruption: The Turkish Challenge” 2000 Journal for International Affairs 127.5
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German companies had been estimated to exceed US$3 billion a year.  When the 6
economic operators of some countries begin to pay bribes, they put pressure on 
those from other countries to do the same. The cost of not doing so is lost contracts.  7
Among the economic changes that have taken place in recent years, privatisation 
has been most closely linked with corruption.  There is no question that public or 8
state enterprises have been a major source of corruption and especially of political 
corruption because they have occasionally been used to finance the activities of po-
litical parties and to provide jobs to the supporters of particular political groups.   9
A comprehensive understanding of anti-bribery legislation of countries in the same 
stage of economic development as South Africa will contribute to a greater under-
standing of legislative ambiguities and positive legislative trends experienced in the 
BRICS. This understanding can then be used in the South African context and in turn 
further our economic development.  
This study will start with a generic definition of corruption in order to describe the 
general phenomenon. This is not a legal-technical (legislative-specific) definition and 
is purely used in order to describe the phenomenon; not the elements of the crime in 
the respective jurisdictions:  
“Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. It hurts 
 Bray, J. (2007) Facing up to Corruption: A Practical Business Guide, Control Risks Group.6
 Bray, J. (2007) Facing up to Corruption: A Practical Business Guide, Control Risks Group. 7
 Baran “Corruption: The Turkish Challenge” 2000 Journal for International Affairs 127.8




Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
everyone who depends on the integrity of people in a position of 
authority”.   10
or 
“In its most general form, corruption (from the Latin verb rumpere, mean-
ing ‘to damage, break, violate something’) may be defined as an official’s 
use of his position for purposes of private advantage. The manifestations 
of corruption are innumerable. They include informal payments in the con-
text of business-state relations (‘business’ corruption), the subornation by 
one commercial firm of officials employed by another (‘corporate’ corrup-
tion), the endless gifts and payments that consumers offer to public ser-
vice authorities (‘everyday’ corruption), and the promotion of business in-
terests through the secret provision of funds to party bosses (‘party’ cor-
ruption).”   11
Recently in the constitutional court of South Africa the court had the following to say 
about corruption: 
“As the preamble to the recent South African legislation on corruption, the 
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 recognises, 
corruption undermines the ‘institutions and values of democracy and ethi-
cal values and morality’ and jeopardises development and the rule of law. 
Corruption is therefore antithetical to the founding values of our constitu-
tional order. Indeed, as this Court held in South African Association of 
 Transparency International (2013) “Corruption Perceptions Index” http://cpi.transparency.org/10
cpi2011 (Accessed on 2012-03-16). 
 Barsukova “Academic Debates and Russian Reality” 2009 Russian Politics and Law 8 - 27.11
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Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath and Others: Corruption and maladminis-
tration are inconsistent with the rule of law and the fundamental values of 
our Constitution. They undermine the constitutional commitment to human 
dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights 
and freedoms. They are the antithesis of the open, accountable, democra-
tic government required by the Constitution. If allowed to go unchecked 
and unpunished they will pose a serious threat to our democratic state.”  12
Bribery constitutes a form of corruption, and will be the type of corruption focused on 
in this study. As all the BRICS countries to some extent have anti-bribery policies in 
place, the writer also decided to focus specifically on anti-bribery provisions for com-
parative purposes. 
Bribery is an act of giving money or gift giving that alters the conduct of the recipient. 
Bribery constitutes a crime and is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as “the offering, 
giving, receiving or soliciting of any item of value to influence the actions of an official 
or other person in charge of a public or legal duty”.   13
The specific definition of bribery will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but this will 
be indicated where necessary.  
1 2 History and causes of corruption 
Corruption is not a new phenomenon. The crime of corruption has plagued human 
societies since the earliest forms of social order evolved. The Code of Hammurabi 
 S v Shaik and Others (CCT 86/07) [2008] ZACC 7; 2008 (5) SA 354 (CC); 2008 (2) SACR 165 12
(CC); 2008 (8) BCLR 834 (CC) (29 May 2008).
 Garner Black's Law Dictionary 9th ed (2009). 13
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(2100 BC) and the Bible refer to this phenomenon (Deuteronomy 10:17; 16:19).  14
Two thousand years ago, Kautilya, the prime minister of an Indian kingdom, had al-
ready written a book, Arthashastra, discussing it. Seven centuries ago, Dante also 
placed bribers in the deepest parts of hell, reflecting the medieval distaste for corrupt 
behaviour.   15
As Susan Rose-Ackerman, professor of Jurisprudence and co-director of the Centre 
for Law, Economics, and Public Policy at Yale Law School, states: 
“Widespread corruption is a symptom, not the disease itself.”  16
Ackerman further states: 
“The incidence and level of bribery […] depends not just on potential gains 
from corruption but also on the riskiness of corrupt deals.”  17
What causes corruption is therefor of paramount importance as causes could possi-
bly be hampered when one legislates against it. In other words, make it more “risky” 
for the potential briber or bribe.  18
 Jonathan Burchell & John Milton Principles of Criminal Law 3ed (2005) 890.14
 Tavits, M. (2005) Causes of Corruption: Testing Competing Hypotheses, Working paper, Nuffield 15
College.
 Rose-Ackerman The Political Economy of Corruption 46 http://www.iie.com/publications/chapter16 -
s_preview/12/2iie2334.pdf (Accessed 2014-11-03).
 Rose-Ackerman The Political Economy of Corruption 46 http://www.iie.com/publications/chapter17 -
s_preview/12/2iie2334.pdf (Accessed 2014-11-03).
 Masiloane & Dintwe “Developing an anti-corruption strategy for the South African public sector” 18
2014 Journal for Public Administration 180 – 198.
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As Messick and Kleinfeld state,  an obvious first step is to ensure that laws are in 19
place to deter corruption. Prevention is regarded as better than cure. According to 
the Department of Public Service and Administration Report, the costs of preventing 
corruption are far lower than investigating it, holding disciplinary inquiries, and taking 
cases to court. The World Bank Group further explains that anti-corruption laws work 
to deter corrupt actions, prosecute corruptors and resurrect a sense of justice.  20
It is for that reason that a comparative analysis of BRICS (who are in the same 
stages of economic development and therefor easier to compare) is needed, in order 
to identify positive legislative trends in each country who address these causes and 
that then could be applied in South Africa. 
Tanzi  argues that causes of corruption can be divided into direct causes and indi21 -
rect causes. 
1 2 1 Factors contributing directly to corruption 
1 2 1 1 Regulations and authorisations 
In many countries, and especially in developing countries, the role of the state is of-
ten carried out through the use of numerous rules or regulations. In these countries, 
licenses, permits and authorisations of various sorts are required to engage in many 
 Majila, Taylor & Raga “A comparative analysis of the implementation of anti-corruption legislation 19
by anti-corruption agencies in the provinces of the Eastern and Northern Cape” TD The Journal for 
Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa (2014) 219 – 240.
 Majila, Taylor & Raga “A comparative analysis of the implementation of anti-corruption legislation 20
by anti-corruption agencies in the provinces of the Eastern and Northern Cape” TD The Journal for 
Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa (2014) 219 – 240.
 Tanzi Corruption around the world: causes, consequences, scope and cures (1998) 559.21
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activities.   22
The existence of these regulations and authorisations gives a kind of monopoly 
power to the officials who must authorise or inspect the activities. These officials may 
refuse the authorisations or may simply sit on a decision for months or even years. 
Thus, they can use their public power to extract bribes from those who need the au-
thorisations or permits. In India, for example, the expression "licence raj" referred to 
the individual who sold the permits needed to engage in many forms of economic 
activities.   23
The existence of these regulations generates the need for frequent contacts between 
citizens and bureaucrats. It also requires an enormous amount of time to be spent by 
the citizens in acquiring these permits and in dealing with public officials. This time 
that is taken away from managing the enterprises can be reduced through the pay-
ment of bribes.  24
1 2 1 2 Taxation 
Taxes based on clear laws and not requiring contacts between taxpayers and tax in-
spectors are much less likely to lead to acts of corruption.  However, when the fol25 -
 Tavits, M. (2005) Causes of Corruption: Testing Competing Hypotheses, Working paper, Nuffield 22
College.
 Mauro, P. (1998) Corruption: Causes, Consequences and Agenda for Research, IMF/World Bank 23
Finance and Development, March.
 Myint, U. (2000) Corruption: Causes, Consequences and Cures, Asia-Pacific Development Journal,24
7(2).
 Myint, U. (2000) Corruption: Causes, Consequences and Cures, Asia-Pacific Development Journal,25
7(2).
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lowing situations arise, corruption is likely to be a major problem in tax and customs 
administrations: 
1 2 1 2 1 The laws are difficult to understand and can be interpreted differently so 
that taxpayers need assistance in complying with them; 
1 2 1 2 2 The payment of taxes requires frequent contacts between taxpayers and 
tax administrators; 
1 2 1 2 3 The wages of the tax administrators are low; 
1 2 1 2 4 Acts of corruption on the part of the tax administrators are ignored, not eas-
ily discovered, or when discovered, penalised only mildly; 
1 2 1 2 5 The administrative procedures lack transparency and are not closely moni-
tored within the tax or customs administrations; 
1 2 1 2 6 Tax administrators have discretion over important decisions, such as those 
related to the provision of tax incentives, determination of tax liabilities, selection of 
audits, litigations, and so on; and 
1 2 1 2 7 More broadly, the controls from the state (the principal) on the agents 
charged with carrying out its functions are weak.  26
1 2 1 3 Spending decisions 
Corruption can also affect public expenditure when there is a lack of transparency 
and if effective institutional controls are the main factors leading to corruption.  27
 Mauro, P. (1998) Corruption: Causes, Consequences and Agenda for Research, IMF/World Bank 26
Finance and Development, March.
 Swamy, A., Knack, S., Lee, Y. and Azfar, O. (2000) Gender and Corruption, Working paper, 27
Williams College.
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1 2 1 4 Provision for goods and services at below-market prices 
In most countries, the government engages in the provision of goods, services, and 
resources at below-market prices – for example, foreign exchange, credit, electricity, 
water, public housing, some rationed goods, access to educational and health facili-
ties, access to public land, and so on. Even access to some forms of pensions, such 
as those for disability, falls into this category because the individuals who get them, 
have paid less in contributions to the pension funds over time than the pension they 
get once their disability status is approved. Sometimes, because of limited supply, 
rationing or queuing becomes unavoidable. Excess demand is created and decisions 
have to be made to apportion the limited supply.  These decisions are often made 28
by public employees. Those who want these goods (the users) would be willing to 
pay a bribe to get access (or a higher access) to what the government is providing. It 
is thus not surprising that in all the areas mentioned supra, cases of corruption have 
been reported.  29
1 2 1 5 Other discretionary decisions 
Besides the areas mentioned supra, in many countries public officials can find them-
selves in positions where they have discretion over important decisions. In these sit-
uations, corruption, including high-level or political corruption, can play a major role.   30
1 2 2 Indirect causes of corruption 
Besides the factors that promote corruption directly, as discussed in the previous 
 Bray, J. (2007) Facing up to Corruption: A Practical Business Guide, Control Risks Group. 28
 Bray, J. (2007) Facing up to Corruption: A Practical Business Guide, Control Risks Group. 29
 Swamy, Knack, Lee and Azfar (2000) Gender and Corruption, Working paper, Williams College.30
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section, other factors can contribute to corruption indirectly. Some of these are dis-
cussed briefly in this section. 
1 2 2 1 Quality of the bureaucracy 
The quality of the bureaucracy varies greatly among countries. In some, public sec-
tor jobs give a lot of prestige and status, in others, much less so. Many factors con-
tribute to that quality. 
Absence of politically motivated hiring, patronage and nepotism, and clear rules on 
promotions and hiring, in addition to some of the factors discussed separately below, 
all contribute to the quality of a bureaucracy. The incentive structure plus tradition go 
a long way toward explaining why some bureaucracies are much less corrupt than 
others.  31
1 2 2 2 Level of public sector wages 
1 2 2 3 Penalty systems 
Tanzi follows Nobel laureate economist Gary Becker's (1968)  classic analysis of 32
crime prevention, given the probability that the perpetrator of a crime would be 
caught that the penalty imposed, plays an important role in determining the probabili-
ty that criminal or illegal acts would take place. In theory, all things being equal, cor-
ruption could be reduced by increasing the penalties on those who get caught. This 
analysis implies that the penalty structure existing in a country is an important factor 
 Bray (2007) Facing up to Corruption: A Practical Business Guide, Control Risks Group.31
 Becker “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach” 1968 Journal of Political Economy 32
169-217.
!19
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
in determining the extent of corruption in that country.   33
1 2 2 4 Institutional controls 
The other important ingredient in Gary Becker's analysis is the probability that those 
who commit crimes would be caught.  This leads to the role of institutional controls.  34
The existence of these controls reflects to a large extent the attitude of the political 
body toward this problem.  Generally, the most effective controls should be those 35
that exist inside institutions.  This is really the first line of defence. Honest and effec36 -
tive supervisors, good auditing offices and clear rules on ethical behaviour should be 
able to discourage or discover corrupt activities. Good and transparent procedures 
should make it easier for these offices to exercise their controls.  
1 2 2 5 Transparency of rules, laws, and processes 
In many countries, the lack of transparency in rules, laws and processes creates a 
fertile ground for corruption. Rules are often confusing, the documents specifying 
these are not publicly available, and, at times the rules are changed without properly 
publicised announcements. Laws or regulations are written in a way that only trained 
 Becker “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach” 1968 Journal of Political Economy 33
169-217.
 Becker “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach” 1968 Journal of Political Economy 34
169-217.
 Becker “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach” 1968 Journal of Political Economy 35
169-217.
 Woods Anti-corruption Reader (Unpublished, available on request) Woods 2011. Anti-corruption 36
legislation – a failed response to procurement corruption. Paper presented to the Public Procure-
ment Regulation in Africa Conference, Stellenbosch, South Africa.
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lawyers can understand and are often conceptually opaque about important aspects, 
thus leaving grounds for different interpretations. Processes or procedures on policy 
matters and other actions, for example competitions for public projects, are equally 
opaque, so that at times it is difficult to understand or to determine the process that 
was followed before a decision was reached. This makes it difficult to determine 
whether corruption has played a role in some important decisions.  37
1 2 2 6 Example by leadership 
A final contributing factor is the example provided by leadership. When the top politi-
cal leaders do not provide the right example, either because they engage in acts of 
corruption or, as is more often the case, because they condone such acts on the part 
of relatives, friends, or political associates, it cannot be expected that the employees 
in the public administration will behave differently.  38
As previously stated, what causes corruption is of paramount importance as causes 
could possibly be hampered when one legislates against it. It is clear that all direct 
and indirect causes, as identified by Tanzi,  should be addressed when legislating in 39
order to curb corruption. 
 Bray (2007) Facing up to Corruption: A Practical Business Guide, Control Risks Group. 37
 Woods Anti-corruption Reader (Unpublished, available on request) Woods 2011. Anti-corruption 38
legislation – a failed response to procurement corruption.  Paper presented to the Public Procure-
ment Regulation in Africa Conference, Stellenbosch, South Africa.
 Tanzi Corruption around the world: causes, consequences, scope and cures (1998) 559.39
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1 3 Bribery specifically 
Bribery is known to be one of the world’s main areas of corruption. This is particularly 
true of its public sector component.  This is where many of the acts of both major 40
and minor corruption take place. It is therefore important to discuss its characteristics 
in more detail. I have also chosen to compare anti-bribery legislation in the BRICS 
for comparative purposes and most of the BRICS have such legislation in place.  
Bribes (or backhanders or kickbacks or facilitation fees) refer to the payments made 
by private agents, or sought by officials, in return for supplying favours such as gov-
ernment contracts, benefits, lower taxes, licences or legal outcomes. Officials in 
charge of purchasing are the most vulnerable when it comes to bribery.   41
A study undertaken by the South African Public Service Commission in 2009 indicat-
ed that many public officials in South Africa believed that it was acceptable for them 
to receive gifts from suppliers. In fact 44% of those interviewed, believe they should 
be allowed to accept gifts under certain circumstances. The study once again high-
lighted the main question surrounding the giving of gifts to public officials by service 
providers: “When does a gift become a bribe?” Gifts can range from innocuous items 
such as calendars, diaries or a pen and get progressively bigger and approach the 
 Woods Anti-corruption Reader (Unpublished, available on request) Woods 2011. Anti-corruption 40
legislation – a failed response to procurement corruption.  Paper presented to the Public Procure-
ment Regulation in Africa Conference, Stellenbosch, South Africa.
 Woods Anti-corruption Reader (Unpublished, available on request) Woods 2011. Anti-corruption 41
legislation – a failed response to procurement corruption.  Paper presented to the Public Procure-
ment Regulation in Africa Conference, Stellenbosch, South Africa.
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scale of a motorcar, an overseas trip or a substantial sum of money.   42
Bribes range from the petty corruption category, where a policeman is bribed not to 
issue a fine or make an arrest, where a customs official is bribed not to inspect an 
imported good, etcetera, to where a cabinet minister is bribed by an international 
arms manufacturer to accept their bid in a tender process.  
While the use of bribes to obtain contracts can be initiated by either party, govern-
ment officials in charge of purchasing are the most vulnerable. Bribery is a high risk 
activity, not only because there are chances of being caught, but also because cir-
cumstances can sometimes change and thus prevent the awarding of the business 
to the briber who has already paid the bribe – leaving the briber unable to use legal 
ways of claiming the return of the bribe monies.   43
 Public Service Commission “Official Magazine of the Public Service Commission” 2009 issue http://42
www.psc.gov.za/documents/2010/ReportOfCitizenFinalPrint%20.pdf. (Accessed 2013-10-10).
 Woods Anti-corruption Reader (Unpublished, available on request) Woods 2011. Anti-corruption 43
legislation – a failed response to procurement corruption. Paper presented to the Public Procure-
ment Regulation in Africa Conference, Stellenbosch, South Africa.
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2 Anti-bribery legislation in Brazil 
2 1 Introduction to Brazil 
Brazil has been subject to significant economic transformation over the past ten 
years resulting from a large-scale privatisation program, the stabilisation of the 
economy, and the strengthening of the banking system. Brazil’s international re-
serves were therefore calculated at more than US$350bn in 2011,  which sufficiently 44
protected Brazil’s economy in the financial crises in 2008 and more recently.  45
Brazil has a population of 193 million,  while the economically active population was 46
estimated at 97,9 million in 2007,  with a US$2,48 trillion GDP (world’s seventh 47
highest)  and 5,1% real growth (a measure of economic growth from one period to 48
another expressed as a%age and adjusted for inflation) in 2012.  Brazil’s strong fi49 -
nancial performance and consistent economic growth renders it an attractive market 
for multinational organisations. 
As with all emerging markets Brazil’s investment opportunities are immense, while 
 Leahy “‘Brics’ to debate possible Eurozone aid” Beyond Brics (2011-09-13).44
 Barbosa “Viewpoint Brazil – steady growth for America’s only Bric” BBC News (2011-01-12).45
 IBGE “2011 Population Projection” http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/presidencia/noticias/noticia_im46 -
pressao.php?id_noticia=1961 (Accessed on 2013-01-22).
 Fonseca et al “Introduction to Federative Republic of Brazil” 2010 The Sloan Centre for aging and 47
work.
 World Bank “Gross Domestic Product, Brazil” https://www.google.co.za/publicdata/explore?48
ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=ny_gdp_mktp_cd&idim=country:BRA&dl=en&hl=en&q=brazil%20gdp 
(Accessed 2013-01-21).
 YCHARTS “Brazil Real GDP Growth” http://ycharts.com/indicators/brazil_real_gdp_growth (Ac49 -
cessed 2013-01-21).
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the global perception of corruption is also a reality.  In Transparency International’s 50
Corruption Perceptions Index (TI’s CPI) in 2014 (this index measures the perceived 
levels of public sector corruption in a country – a score of 0 indicates a highly “clean” 
{incorrupt state} and 10 indicates a highly corrupt state), Brazil scored a 4,3 – rank-
ing it 69th of 175 countries. By comparison, Sweden scored an 8,7, the United 
States scored a 7,4 and China scored a 3,6.  Brazil further scored 57,9, far below 51
world averages, in the 2012 Index of Economic Freedom.  The World Bank/IFC En52 -
terprise Survey 2009 reports that nearly 70% of surveyed companies perceive cor-
ruption as a “major constraint” for doing business in Brazil.  The World Economic 53
Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011 finds that corruption is among the 
most “problematic factors” relating to business constraints in Brazil, ranking below 
taxes, inadequate infrastructure, and government inefficiency.  54
The safe conclusion one can make is that corruption is a serious problem to this 
country and I find the following statement rings true: 
“There has traditionally been a high tolerance in Brazil for bending rules or 
breaking laws. As such, a key part of the country’s culture is the jeito or 
jeitinho – or ‘the little way’, meaning finding a way around red tape or legal 
 Currie et al “Anti-corruption Compliance in Brazil: Top Ten Considerations” 2011 Association of 50
Corporate Counsel.
 “Transparency International (2014) “Corruption Perceptions Index” http://cpi.transparency.org/51
cpi2014 (Accessed on 2015-06-30). 
 The Heritage Foundation “2012 Index of Economic Freedom” http://www.heritage.org/index/.52
 The World Bank “IFC Enterprise Survey 2009” http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/.53
 World Economic Forum “The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011” http://www3.weforum.org/54
docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2010-11.pdf.
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frustrations. While in its most innocuous sense the practice can mean cir-
cumventing nuisance bureaucracy or relying on a friend in government to 
facilitate or waive a necessary approval, it often evolves into practices that 
are more damaging to society such as taking benefits one is not entitled 
to or purchasing goods one knows to be stolen.”  55
2 2 Corruption culture 
It is said that Brazil has transformed the venality of senior officials to an art form and, 
at least up until this time, its citizenry has generally turned a blind eye toward such 
transgressions.   56
A notorious example is that of Adhemar de Barros, the corrupt mayor and governor 
of São Paulo during the 1950s and 1960s.  Taking pride in skimming funds from 57
public works projects he endorsed, he encouraged his backers to defend these un-
savoury practices with the motto rouba mas faz (“he steals but he achieves”).  58
A few classic examples of unsavoury financial dealings by senior officials over the 
years will further define this aspect of Brazilian culture: 
Fernando Collor was Brazil’s president from 1990 to 1992. He was an obscure gov-
ernor of the state of Alagoas before gaining the presidency. Upon assuming power, 
 Stocker “Anti-corruption Developments in the BRIC Countries: A MAPI Series” 2012 MAPI 1-70.55
 International business attitudes to corruption, 2006, p. 5, Control Risks and Simmons & Simmons, 56
available at http://emergingmarkets.asia/emaf/images/stories/resources/International-Business-Atti-
tudes-to-Corruption-%28Control-Risks- Group,-2006%29-English.pdf. 
 Gallant “The Art of Stealing” http://www.brazzil.com/cvrmar97.htm (Accessed 2015-07-01).57
 Gallant “The Art of Stealing” http://www.brazzil.com/cvrmar97.htm (Accessed 2015-07-01).58
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he launched a series of extortions through an adviser with barely any attempt to be 
subtle or secretive (for example receiving direct payments in the form of cheques). 
Collor was later acquitted of ordinary criminal charges in his judicial trial before 
Brazil's Supreme Federal Tribunal, for lack of valid evidence. After the end of his pe-
riod of disqualification, Collor was elected a senator of the Republic in the 2006 gen-
eral elections and began his term in February 2007.  59
The Mensalão scandal (Portuguese: Escândalo do Mensalão), is considered possi-
bly the “boldest, most scandalous case of corruption ever to have taken place in 
Brazil”,  and threatened to bring down the government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in 60
2005. Mensalão is a neologism and variant of the word for "big monthly 
payment" (salário mensal or mensalidade).  61
The scandal broke on June 6, 2005 when Brazilian Congressional Deputy Roberto 
Jefferson told the Brazilian newspaper Folha de São Paulo that the ruling Partido 
dos Trabalhadores (PT) had paid a number of congressional deputies 30 000 real 
(around US$12 000 at the time) every month in order to vote for legislation favoured 
by the ruling party. The funds were said to originate from state-owned companies' 
advertising budgets, funnelled through an advertising agency owned by Marcos 
Valério.  62
 Info Please “Collor de Mello, Fernando” http://www.infoplease.com/encyclopedia/people/collor-de-59
mello fernando.html.
 Critical Corporate Issues Whatever happened to the workers party 2012 http://www.criticalcorp.60 -
com.br/?lg=en (Accessed 2014-11-01).
 Critical Corporate Issues Whatever happened to the workers party 2012 http://www.criticalcorp.61 -
com.br/?lg=en (Accessed 2014-11-01).
 Folha de São Paulo http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/internacional/en/ (Accessed 2014-11-01).62
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Many key advisers to President Lula resigned, while several deputies were faced 
with the choice of resignation or expulsion from congress, though the president him-
self went on to be re-elected in 2006. The scandal also sparked unproved charges of 
illegal campaign contributions from Cuba and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia and political connections to the assassination of Celso Daniel, mayor of 
the city of Santo André.  63
2 3 Anti-bribery legislation discussed specifically 
2 3 1 The Penal Code  will be discussed first. This code proposes penalties for mis64 -
conduct including embezzlement of public funds, public graft, acceptance of bribes, 
breach of public trust, offering of bribes and bribery in international dealings. The fo-
cus of this law is therefore on public bribery and the related conduct of Brazilian offi-
cials.  
Article 332 states that “traffic of influence” entails: 
“Requesting, requiring, charging, or obtaining, for oneself or to another 
person, advantage or promise of advantage in exchange for influencing 
an act carried out by a public official in the exercise of his/her functions.”  65
The penalty for this offence is imprisonment from two to five years, and a fine. 
“Active bribery” is defined in Article 333 as: 
 Critical Corporate Issues Whatever happened to the workers party 2012 http://www.criticalcorp.63 -
com.br/?lg=en (Accessed 2014-11-01).
 2848 of 1940.64
 2848 of 1940. 65
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“Offering or promising an undue advantage to a public official to induce him/her 
to perform, omit, or delay an official act.”  66
The penalty for active bribery is imprisonment from two to twelve years, and a fine. 
Article 337-B of the code defines “active bribery” in international dealings as: 
“Promising, offering, or giving, directly or indirectly, any improper advan-
tage to a foreign public official or to a third person, in order for him/her to 
put into practice, to omit, or to delay any official act relating to an in-
ternational business transaction.”  67
The penalty for active bribery in international dealings is imprisonment from one to 
eight years, and a fine. 
Traffic of Influence in an International Business Transaction (art. 337-C): 
“Requesting, requiring, charging, or obtaining, for oneself or for another 
person, directly or indirectly, any advantage or promise of advantage in 
exchange for influencing an act carried out by a foreign public official in 
the exercise of his functions relating to an international business transac-
tion.”  68
2 3 2 The code of conduct for high-ranking federal government officials in the rules 
 2848 of 1940.66
 2848 of 1940.67
 2848 of 1940.68
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applicable to government officials further states:  69
2 3 2 1 They cannot receive a salary or any other remuneration from a private source 
in violation of the law, or transport, lodging, or any other favours from individuals;  
2 3 2 2 Their participation in seminars and conferences may be sponsored by the 
private sector provided that  
(i)It’s a matter of their personal interest;  
(ii)The information on any financial compensation and/or payment of travel ex-
penses made by private sponsor is duly disclosed; and 
(iii)The sponsor must have no interest in any decisions that can be made by the 
official. 
2 3 2 3 Acceptance of gifts is authorised in only three cases:  
(i)If the gift has no financial value;  
(ii)If the value of the gift is less than BRL100 (USD58); or 
(iii)If the gift is a matter of protocol on the part of a foreign official and involves 
reciprocity.  70
2 3 3 Further, the code of ethics of BNDES (National Economic and Social Develop-
ment Bank – owned by the Federal Government) regulates monies to the BNDES 
officials: 
 Code of Conduct for High-ranking Federal Government Officials http://www.planalto.gov.br/69
ccivil_03/codigos/codi_conduta/cod_conduta.htm (Accessed 2014-11-01).
 Code of Conduct for High-ranking Federal Government Officials http://www.planalto.gov.br/70
ccivil_03/codigos/codi_conduta/cod_conduta.htm (Accessed 2014-11-01).
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The BNDES officials are not allowed to receive any monies, gift, or advantage, in-
cluding personal invitations for travel and other benefits, except where the invitation 
is made by a foreign official with reciprocity. 
Acceptance of gifts is authorised only in the following cases:  
(i)If the gift has no financial value; or  
(ii)If the gift is distributed by the entity as courtesy, advertisement or promotion or 
in special events or in dates of celebration, as long as the financial value of the 
gift is BRL100 or less (USD58), considering the sum of the value of all gifts sent 
by one entity. 
The penalties for contravention are a reprimand to the government official. 
2 3 4 Official Misconduct Law is only relevant insofar one looks at section 9, which 
lists the following as acts of government impropriety involving illicit enrichment:  
2 3 4 1 “To accept, either for oneself or someone else, monies, personal or real 
property, or any kind of direct or indirect economic advantage, in the form of a 
commission,%age, gratuity or gift from any party that has a direct or indirect interest 
that can be accomplished or furthered by an act or omission of the civil servant in 
performing his or her functions” (Article 9, I);   71
2 3 4 2 “To accept any employ or commission or engage in consulting or advisory 
work for any natural person or legal entity that has an interest that can be achieved 
or furthered by an act or omission committed in the performance of a civil servant’s 
functions” (Article 9, VIII);   72
 8429 of 1992.71
 8429 of 1992.72
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2 3 4 3 “To accept any economic advantages in exchange for arranging the use or 
investment of any public monies” (Article 9, IX). Likewise, under Article 11, “revealing 
or allowing any third party to gain access to information regarding any political or 
economic measure that can affect the price of a commodity, good or service, before 
that measure is officially announced, shall constitute government misconduct in 
violation of the principles of public administration” (Article 11, VII).  73
2 3 5 Law 12.846/13, known as the Anti-corruption Law (also known as the 
“clean companies act”) 
Public bribery has been a criminal offence in Brazil since 1940; other corruption-re-
lated activities have similarly been criminalised since that time.   74
In what has been viewed as a major inadequacy in the country's anti-corruption law, 
however, only individuals and not entities can be held criminally liable for such con-
duct, as Brazil is a civil law country. Unlike common law jurisdictions, civil law sys-
tems generally do not apply criminal liability to legal (as opposed to natural) persons. 
Civil law typically considers corporations to be abstract intangible entities that have 
no capacity to meet the mens rea (intent) required to establish criminal responsibility. 
As such, even if a corporation (i e a legal person) is the ultimate beneficiary of a cor-
rupt activity such as bribery, it cannot be held criminally liable in Brazil. 
Corporations are subject to criminal prosecution or liability in Brazil only in the case 
of a few environmental crimes and antitrust violations – not corruption. In such latter 
cases, until the new law goes into effect, only the directors, management, employees 
 8429 of 1992.73
 MAPI Brazil enacts Long Pending Anti-Corruption Legislation https://www.mapi.net/research/publi74 -
cations/brazil-enacts-long-pending-anti-corruption-legislation (Accessed on 2015-07-15).
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or agents of a corporation can be held criminally liable for their actions on behalf of 
the corporation.  75
The “new” law is a major step in Brazil's ability to fight corruption. This development 
brought the country into compliance with the international agreements to which it is a 
signatory, including the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials (ratified by 
Brazil in 2000) and the UN Convention against Corruption (ratified in 2005). 
This measure, while not creating any new criminal offences, embraces the estab-
lished common-law concept of respondeat superior;  that is, it addresses corporate 76
civil and administrative liability for illicit conduct identified in the statute (for example 
bribery, fraud in government procurement, bid rigging, fraud in contracts signed with 
public bodies, impairing public officers' investigative activities, and influencing or fi-
nancing others to engage in illegal acts against the government) that is perpetrated 
by a company's representatives, either for the direct benefit of the corporation or for 
which the company receives a benefit. 
The “new law” was passed by the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of 
the National Congress) on April 24, 2013; approved by the Senate on July 4, 2013; 
signed by president Dilma Rousseff on August 1, 2013; and published in the Diário 
Oficial da União (the official gazette of Brazil's federal government) on August 2, 
 MAPI Brazil enacts Long Pending Anti-Corruption Legislation https://www.mapi.net/research/publi75 -
cations/brazil-enacts-long-pending-anti-corruption-legislation (Accessed on 2015-07-15).
 Business Anti-corruption Portal “Public Anti-corruption Initiatives” http://www.business-anti-corrup76 -
tion.com/country-profiles/latin-america-the-caribbean/brazil/initiatives/public-anti-corruption-initia-
tives/ (Accessed on 12-02-12). 
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2013. The act took effect on January 29, 2014, 180 days after that publication.  77
2 3 5 1 Specifics of the New Law  78
2 3 5 1 1 Proscribed Conduct 
Under the new law, the bribery of domestic and foreign public officials is broadly de-
fined to include promoting, offering, or giving, "directly or indirectly, an improper ben-
efit to a public agent […] or […] a third party related to him.”  79
Also prohibited is the financing, paying for, or otherwise sponsoring the offences 
identified in the law. Similarly proscribed is activity concealing such illegal activities.   80
The act covers skulduggery in the public procurement realm such as bid rigging, im-
peding or frustrating a due administrative process, committing fraud in the submis-
sion of a bid, or seeking to obtain any undue advantage.  81
The law has broad extraterritorial reach, applying to any covered illicit activity involv-
ing Brazilian or foreign public bodies by Brazilian corporate entities, regardless of 
whether the offence is committed in Brazil or abroad. Additionally, it covers offences 
 Business Anti-corruption Portal “Public Anti-corruption Initiatives” http://www.business-anti-corrup77 -
tion.com/country-profiles/latin-america-the-caribbean/brazil/initiatives/public-anti-corruption-initia-
tives/ (Accessed on 12-02-12). 
  International Law Enforcement Reporter Compliance in Brazil: Current and Future Perspective 78
https://tfoxlaw.wordpress.com/2011/03/10/brazil-and-anti-corruption-legislation/ (Accessed on 2015-
07-15).
 Law 12.846/13.79
 International Law Enforcement Reporter Compliance in Brazil: Current and Future Perspective 80
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committed in Brazil by foreign companies operating there, by Brazilian subsidiaries 
of foreign companies, and by Brazilian agents or other authorised representatives 
acting on behalf of foreign companies.  82
For administrative or judicial sanctions to be applied to a legal entity under the law, it 
is not necessary that there be an underlying finding of criminal liability on the part of 
directors, officers, employees or agents of that entity. Moreover, prosecutors need 
not establish that the entity's directors, officers, employees, or agents acted with cor-
rupt intent. The law provides that covered "legal persons shall be held strictly liable, 
administratively or civilly, for the injurious acts stipulated [therein] performed in their 
interest or benefit, exclusive or not."   83
It should be noted that the new Brazilian law does not include a facilitating payments 
exception (i e an exception for payments to government officials to secure perfor-
mance of routine government non-discretionary actions). In this regard, the law is 
similar to the UK Bribery Act but unlike the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, two 
anti-corruption laws with broad extraterritorial implications. 
2 3 5 1 2 Sanctions 
Civil fines for violations of the new law can be steep, running to as much as 20% of 
the entity's gross revenue in the year prior to that in which the administrative pro-
 Business Anti-corruption Portal “Public Anti-corruption Initiatives” http://www.business-anti-corrup82 -
tion.com/country-profiles/latin-america-the-caribbean/brazil/initiatives/public-anti-corruption-initia-
tives/ (Accessed on 12-02-12). 
 Law 12.846/13.83
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ceeding was initiated.  Such fines are never to be "less than the benefit gained"  by 84 85
the illicit activity if such amount can be established. If the prior year's gross billings 
cannot be calculated, fines may vary between R$6 000 and R$60 000,000 (approxi-
mately $2 500-$25 000 000). The higher amount, R$60 000 000, does not appear to 
be a cap on the fine since other provisions of the law establish that "application of 
the penalties stipulated in this article does not exclude, in any case, the obligation to 
fully indemnify the damage caused."   86
Penalties in judicial proceedings could include a loss of assets, injunctions, debar-
ment, partial suspension of an entity's activities, and even dissolution of the offend-
ing entity. Offenders could lose public "incentives, subsidies, subventions, donations, 
or loans from public bodies or entities and public financial institutions or those con-
trolled by the public authorities […] for a minimum period of […] [one] year and a 
maximum of […][five] years."  87
2 3 5 1 3 Leniency 
It is noteworthy that the new anti-corruption law provides for the mitigation of some 
sanctions if companies have effective compliance programs in place or if they self-





 International Law Enforcement Reporter Compliance in Brazil: Current and Future Perspective 88
https://tfoxlaw.wordpress.com/2011/03/10/brazil-and-anti-corruption-legislation/ (Accessed on 2015-
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With regard to effective compliance programs, entities subject to the act may quality 
for reduced sanctions if they have developed and implemented "internal mecha-
nisms and procedures for integrity, audit, and incentives to report irregularities and 
the effective application of codes of ethics and conduct."   89
Concerning voluntary self-disclosure, the act provides strong incentives for engaging 
in such practices. An entity that reports misconduct before it comes to the attention 
of the authorities, cooperates with investigators (including naming others engaged in 
the violations, if applicable), and ceases the illicit activities before being ordered to 
do so, can qualify for significant leniency.  Such leniency provisions in the law can 90
reduce applicable fines by up to two-thirds, and can also lead to reductions in other 
applicable sanctions.  91
2 3 5 Access to Information Law:  92
The “Information Law”  changed the then legislative environment as follows:  93
Firstly, it legally obligated Brazil’s federal, state, and municipal governments to pub-
lish information, including documents on government spending and administration. It 
will also apply to state-owned corporations and certain non-profit entities that receive 
 Law 12.846/13.89
 International Law Enforcement Reporter Compliance in Brazil: Current and Future Perspective 90
https://tfoxlaw.wordpress.com/2011/03/10/brazil-and-anti-corruption-legislation/ (Accessed on 2015-
07-15).
 Law 12.846/13.91
 Act 12.527 of 2011.92
 Act 12.527 of 2011.93
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government funding.   94
Secondly, the law allowed anyone to request information from the government, 
which, in turn, will have to provide copies of the requested non-classified 
documents.   95
Finally, it set time limits for documents to remain classified.   96
Brazil was the 10th country in Latin America to pass such a freedom of information 
law. 
While the legislation is broad in scope, it lacks clear provisions for its oversight; it 
specifies no authority to define its implementation, regulation, or enforcement. It is 
assumed that the Brazilian Controller General will oversee the law, but the statute 
itself is silent on such matters. It merely states that the president will appoint the 
oversight authority.  
As it stands, the controller is only responsible for deciding appeals to denials of re-
quests for information.  
The procedural aspects of the law are straightforward. Officials will have ten days to 
respond to requests – a period that may be extended with an additional ten days 
provided the person making the request is informed of this in writing.  Officials are 97
charged with helping people file requests, conveying improperly filed requests to the 
 Act 12.527 of 2011.94
 Act 12.527 of 2011.95
 Act 12.527 of 2011.96
 Act 12.527 of 2011.97
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appropriate entity, and informing requestors of their right to appeal denials (and de-
nials require justification).   98
Fees can only be charged to cover photocopying and the legally defined “poor” are 
exempt from paying any costs. Independent of requests, the law will obligate gov-
ernment entities to actively publish a wide assortment of information.  Such manda99 -
tory transparency obligations include official contact details for all employees, as well 
as information about financial operations, spending, procurement contracts, and an-
swers to frequently asked questions, amongst other details.   100
Significantly, the heads of all government entities are required to identify their “infor-
mation officers” within 60 days of the law’s entry into force.  101
2 3 7 Ficha Limpa  102
On February 16, 2012, the Brazilian Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an 
electoral law that was passed in 2010 by the country’s legislature and signed by 
then-president Lula. Late in 2011, the Supreme Court ruled that the law’s provisions 
would be properly applied for the first time for the October 2012 elections. The law in 
question is the so-called Ficha Limpa (“clean record”) law.   103
 Act 12.527 of 2011.98
 Act 12.527 of 2011.99
 Act 12.527 of 2011.100
 Act 12.527 of 2011.101
 Act 135 of 2010.102
 Act 135 of 2010.103
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Its import is simple: candidates with criminal records (including bribery) will be ineli-
gible to run for office.  At the time the law was passed, The Economist reported that 104
about one-quarter of members of the lower house of congress faced criminal 
charges in the country’s Supreme Court or were under investigation, as were 21 of 
81 senators.  Some of these alleged wrongdoers had already been convicted in 105
lower court.  Most of the charges related to violation of campaign finance laws or 106
the pilfering of public funds. Prior existing laws allowed these politicians to be tried 
before the Supreme Court but cases typically lapsed before they were heard. Politi-
cians who were impeached lost the right to run for office, but procedural gimmicks 
allowed individuals facing such a sanction to resign and stand for election again in 
the next cycle.  
Specifically, Ficha Limpa  prevents politicians from running for election to local or 107
federal office if they have been convicted of a crime by more than one judge. Similar 
treatment would bar the running of those whose resignations from office were, as de-
termined by electoral tribunals, designed to avoid impeachment. The law also makes 
potential candidates ineligible for election for eight years after sentencing, stemming 
from the commission of an electoral crime (for example fraud, vote purchasing and 
falsification of public records, etcetera), money laundering, concealment of assets 
 Act 135 of 2010.104
 “Brazil’s congress: Cleaning up: A campaign against corruption,” The Economist, July 8, 2010, 105
www.economist.com/node/16542611?story_id=16542611.
 “Brazil’s congress: Cleaning up: A campaign against corruption,” The Economist, July 8, 2010, 106
www.economist.com/node/16542611?story_id=16542611.
 Act 135 of 2010.107
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and administrative misconduct, and other similar criminal activity.  Administrative 108
misconduct is a broad enough term that it would bar candidates expelled from pro-
fessional organisations, such as attorneys who have been disbarred.  
What may be even more impressive than the breadth of this law is its genesis: its 
passage into law is evidence of the growing anti-corruption sentiment of the average 
Brazilian. Its roots can be traced back to an organisation known as the Movement to 
Combat Electoral Corruption (MCCE), an umbrella enterprise made up of some 43 
concerned NGOs and other entities. Because few Brazilian elected officials wanted 
to sponsor anti-corruption legislation, the MCCE availed itself of a little-known and 
almost never used legislative vehicle known as the “popular initiative clause”.  It 109
provides that a bill can be taken up in Congress if signatures from 1% of the popula-
tion are obtained. Ficha Limpa  is one of only four bills in Brazilian history to ever 110
have been so introduced.  111
In April 2010, Ficha Limpa  arrived unsolicited at the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies 112
in the form of a petition with 1,6 million signatures. Over time, an additional three mil-
lion signatures were gathered online. As public clamour in favour of the proposed law 
grew, lawmakers in Brazil felt pressured to enact it since the people of Brazil has 
 Act 135 of 2010.108
 Brazil’s congress: Cleaning up: A campaign against corruption,” The Economist, July 8, 2010, 109
www.economist.com/node/16542611?story_id=16542611.
 Act 135 of 2010.110
 Brazil’s congress: Cleaning up: A campaign against corruption,” The Economist, July 8, 2010, 111
www.economist.com/node/16542611?story_id=16542611.
 Act 135 of 2010.112
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spoken and proved that they prefer their leaders to set a proper example to their fol-
lowers.   113
 Brazil’s congress: Cleaning up: A campaign against corruption,” The Economist, July 8, 2010, 113
www.economist.com/node/16542611?story_id=16542611.
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3 Anti-bribery legislation in Russia  
3 1 Introduction to Russia 
As the world's largest country, the biggest supplier of natural gas and the second-
largest oil producer, Russia embodies superlatives.  114
Russia now takes 136th place out of 175 (tied with Lebanon and Iran) in the Corrup-
tion Perceptions Index published by Transparency International.   115
According to some expert estimates, the market for corruption in the country ex-
ceeded US$240 billion in 2006.  The Russian think-tank, Indem Foundation, esti116 -
mates that bribes accounted for 20% of Russia's GDP as of 2005.  According to a 117
poll conducted in early 2010, 15% of Russians reported to have paid a bribe in the 
past twelve months.  According to Georgy Satarov, a former aide to Boris Yeltsin, 118
the overall amount of bribes in the Russian economy during the last decade sky-
rocketed from US$33 billion to more than US$400 billion per year in Putin's govern-
 Frommers “Introduction to Russia” http://www.frommers.com/destinations/russia/255709 (Ac114 -
cessed 2014-11-01).
 Transparency International (2014) “Corruption Perceptions Index” www.transparency.org (Ac115 -
cessed 2015-07-01).
 Александр Буксман (27 January 2011). "Ни дать, ни взять Генпрокуратура начала новое 116
наступление на коррумпированных чиновников". Rg.ru. Retrieved 14 May 2011.
 Freeland “The Next Russian Revolution” 2011 http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/117
2011/10/the-next-russian-revolution/308630/.
 Ninenko “Russia’s Anti-corruption predicament” 2012 http://providus.lv/upload_file/Publikacijas/118
Valsts_kvalitate/Nr_15_internetam.pdf.
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ment.  119
According to TRACE International, a United States of America-based anti-corruption 
NGO, 41% of reported demands for bribes in Russia are from government officials 
and employees, and 50% are from the police or military.  120
Russia also finished last (22nd out of 22) in Transparency International’s 2008 Bribe 
Payers Index (BPI), which ranks exporting countries on the likelihood of their export-
ing entities paying bribes abroad.  121
3 2 Corruption culture  
For a long time, the corruption of officials in Russia was legal: up to the 18th century, 
government officials had lived through kormlenie (кормления – "feedings" – i e re-
sources provided by those interested in their area of business).  122
Since 1715, accepting a bribe in any form became a crime, as officials began to re-
ceive fixed salaries.  However, the number of officials under Peter the Great had 123
increased so much that salaries came to be paid irregularly, and bribes, especially 
 Ninenko “Russia’s Anti-corruption predicament” 2012 http://providus.lv/upload_file/Publikacijas/119
Valsts_kvalitate/Nr_15_internetam.pdf.
 US Department of State “2010 Human Rights Report: Russia” http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/120
2010/eur/154447.htm.
 Transparency International (2008) “Bribe Payers Index” http://bpi.transparency.org/bpi2011/ (Ac121 -
cessed on 2012-03-16).
 https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/citd/RussianHeritage/2.RM/SCMEDIA/2.L/KORM.html (Accessed 122
2013-03-01).
 Letiche and Paškov A History of Russian Economic Thought: Ninth through Eighteenth Centuries 123
130-140.
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for officials of lower rank, again became their main source of income.  Soon after 124
the death of Peter, the system of kormlenie was restored and fixed salaries only re-
turned with Catherine II.  The salaries of civil servants were paid in paper money, 125
which in the beginning of the 19th century began to depreciate greatly in comparison 
with metallic money.  Insecurity within the bureaucracy again led to increased cor126 -
ruption.  127
In Soviet Russia, bribery was considered a counter-revolutionary activity, and the 
Criminal Code in 1922 made it punishable by death.  128
On November 20, 2009, the State Duma adopted a law on general principles of pub-
lic service delivery and performance of public functions, which allows officials to 
make the citizens pay for public services and public functions. According to the au-
thors of the law it is intended to make it easier for the citizens and organisations to 
 Retish Power, Control, and Criminal Activity: The Peasantry and the Soviet Revolutionary Tribunal 124
in Viatka Province, 1918-1921 http://www.units.muohio.edu/havighurstcenter/publications/docu-
ments/retish.pdf.
 Retish Power, Control, and Criminal Activity: The Peasantry and the Soviet Revolutionary Tribunal 125
in Viatka Province, 1918-1921 http://www.units.muohio.edu/havighurstcenter/publications/docu-
ments/retish.pdf.
 Letiche and Paškov A History of Russian Economic Thought: Ninth through Eighteenth Centuries 126
130-140.
 Letiche and Paškov A History of Russian Economic Thought: Ninth through Eighteenth Centuries 127
130-140.
 Retish Power, Control, and Criminal Activity: The Peasantry and the Soviet Revolutionary Tribunal 128
in Viatka Province, 1918-1921 http://www.units.muohio.edu/havighurstcenter/publications/docu-
ments/retish.pdf.
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have the public services delivered to them.  However, according to the Russian 129
parliamentary opposition parties CPRF and LDPR, this effectively legalises corrup-
tion.   130
In “modern” Russia it is widely accepted that corruption is one of the main obstacles 
to the country's economic development.  In 2006, the First Deputy of the Prosecu131 -
tor General of Russia reported that according to some expert estimates, the market 
for corruption in the country exceeded US$240 billion.  According to Indem Foun132 -
dation, this number is even larger: in the business sphere alone, corruption volume 
increased from US$33 billion to US$316 billion between 2001 and 2005 (not taking 
into account corruption on the levels of federal-level politicians and business 
elites).  The average bribe that Russian businessmen offer to civil servants in133 -
creased from US$10 000 to US$136 000. More than half of the adult population has 
had direct experience in giving bribes.  134
The fact that there is legal basis permitting civil servants to illegally enrich them-
selves (in Russia, for example, there recently appeared a new term which measures 
how "bribe-permissive" each individual law is) through demanding bribes or through 
 Retish Power, Control, and Criminal Activity: The Peasantry and the Soviet Revolutionary Tribunal 129
in Viatka Province, 1918-1921 http://www.units.muohio.edu/havighurstcenter/publications/docu-
ments/retish.pdf.
 http://en.goldenmap.com/Corruption_in_Russia (Accessed 2013-03-08).130
 Barsukova “Academic Debates and Russian Reality” 2009 Russian Politics and Law 8 - 27.131
 “Of Vadra's riches and Kejriwal's endless accusations IBN” http://m.ibnlive.com/blogs/brijeshkalap132 -
pa/2992/64030/of-vadras-riches-and-kejriwals-endless-accusations.html.
 Honda-tech.com http://honda-tech.com/showthread.php?p=47062700 (Accessed 2012-10-13).133
 Honda-tech.com http://honda-tech.com/showthread.php?p=47062700 (Accessed 2012-10-13).134
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illegal privatisation, or special privileges for civil servants, leads to a large difference 
between legal and illegal income for civil servants.  135
Income of civil servants has been growing. In 2005, their income increased by 
44,1%. This by far exceeds average income growth for the rest of the population, 
which grew by 21,3%.  Comparing quality of life with official salary gives an idea of 136
the level of illegal income. The poorest segments of society lose the most to corrup-
tion, because they have the least financial possibilities compared to wealthier citi-
zens.  137
The Russian government recognises corruption as one of the most serious problems 
facing the country and has taken steps to counter it. Fighting corruption was a top 
agenda of previous Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev and current president 
Vladimir Putin.  An Anti-Corruption Council was established by Medvedev in 2008 138
to oversee Russia’s anti-corruption campaign.  The central document guiding the 139
effort is the National Anti-Corruption Strategy, introduced by Medvedev in 2010.  140
 Suhara “Corruption in Russia: A Historical Perspective”https://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/sympo/    135
03september/pdf/M_Suhara.pdf (Accessed 2015-07-15).
 Sovok Research Blog http://the-russian-art.blogspot.com/2011_06_01_archive.html (Accessed 136
2012-10-13).
 Suhara “Corruption in Russia: A Historical Perspective”https://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/sympo/137
03september/pdf/M_Suhara.pdf (Accessed 2015-07-15).
 http://en.goldenmap.com/Corruption_in_Russia (Accessed 2013-03-08).138
 Treisman, Daniel (2000), ‘The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study’, The Journal of Pub139 -
lic Economics, 76: 399-457.
 Treisman, Daniel (2000), ‘The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study’, The Journal of Pub140 -
lic Economics, 76: 399-457.
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As alluded to previously, Russia is known for a laundry list of unethical business 
practices.  Seventy plus years of socialist dictatorship and the uncertainty sur141 -
rounding the shift from communism to capitalism in the early 1990s provided a fertile 
environment for corruption to flourish.  142
Global companies often cite corruption as a major obstacle to doing business in the 
country.  143
Problems typically identified include the inconsistent application of laws and regula-
tions on a non-transparent basis and lax enforcement of laws and judicial 
decisions.  144
It is in the area of required licensing and permitting that the practice of bribing of 
government functionaries abounds.  This risk is particularly acute when dealing 145
with regional and local authorities.  146
 Shlapentokh, V (2003), ‘Russia’s Acquiescence to Corruption Makes the State Machine Inept’,  141
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 36(2): 151-161.
 Barsukova “Academic Debates and Russian Reality” 2009 Russian Politics and Law 8 - 27.142
 Transparency International (2008) “Bribe Payers Index” http://bpi.transparency.org/bpi2011/ (Ac143 -
cessed on 2012-03-16).
 Berman, H. J. (1963), Justice in the U.S.S.R.: An Interpretation of Soviet Law, Cambridge, MA: 144
Harvard University Press.
  Potter, C. J. (2000), ‘Payment, Gift or Bribe? Exploring the Boundaries in Pre-Petrine Russia’, in 145
Lovell, S., Ledeneva, A. V. and Rogachevskii, A., (eds.), Bribery and Blat in Russia, London: 
Macmillan Press Ltd.
 Potter, C. J. (2000), ‘Payment, Gift or Bribe? Exploring the Boundaries in Pre-Petrine Russia’, in 146
Lovell, S., Ledeneva, A. V. and Rogachevskii, A., (eds.), Bribery and Blat in Russia, London: 
Macmillan Press Ltd.
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Companies complain that the requirements for multiple, often arbitrary, inspections 
and red tape contributes to a high level of corruption.  These issues complicate ef147 -
forts to acquire land, build facilities and conduct day-to-day operations. In terms of 
operations, government-mandated inspections of facilities could tempt companies to 
make payments to officials to avoid costly and sometimes seemingly baseless fees 
or penalties stemming from failed inspections. 
Russia has numerous rules and regulations (for example special decrees of the for-
mer USSR’s Council of Ministers) that have not been updated since the collapse of 
communism and appear to contradict subsequent federal laws like the Russian Civil 
Code.  This poses a problem for companies trying to sort out the maze of Russian 148
legal codes and standards.  
It is this complex, often contradictory, jumble of rules and regulations that provides a 
basis for officials’ abuse in delaying approvals and issuing repeated inspection fail-
ures.  Required payments and fees can multiply, and withholding such payments 149
and fees – even if corruption is suspected – could result in loss of utility service or 
 Shlapentokh, V (2003), ‘Russia’s Acquiescence to Corruption Makes the State Machine Inept’, 147
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 36(2): 151-161.
 Volkov, V. (2000), ‘Patrimonialism versus Rational Bureaucracy: On the Historical Relativity of Cor148 -
ruption,’ in Lovell, S. Ledeneva, A. V. and Rogachevskii, A. (eds.), Bribery and Blat in Russia, Lon-
don: Macmillan Press Ltd.
 Volkov, V. (2000), ‘Patrimonialism versus Rational Bureaucracy: On the Historical Relativity of Cor149 -
ruption,’ in Lovell, S. Ledeneva, A. V. and Rogachevskii, A. (eds.), Bribery and Blat in Russia, Lon-
don: Macmillan Press Ltd.
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other business interruptions.  150
The public procurement arena in Russia remains one of the most corrupt business 
sectors.  Under the current procurement system, some 26 000 federal entities 151
place orders annually outside of a uniform framework.  While the majority of state 152
procurements are said to require a competitive bidding process, tenders too often 
follow an entirely closed process where full tender materials are available only to 
preferred bidders.   153
Last in this list of corrupt practices, which is by no means exhaustive, is a problem 
faced by those exporting goods to Russia. In 2008, then Prime Minister Viktor 
Zubkov charged Russia’s Federal Customs Service of widespread corruption, stating 
that bribes and other illicit practices are endemic among customs officers on the 
country’s western borders.   154
By way of example, he cited the holding of containers for days while officials seek 
bribes to secure their release. These bribes can often be funnelled through interme-
diaries such as customs brokers.  155
  Volkov, V. (2000), ‘Patrimonialism versus Rational Bureaucracy: On the Historical Relativity of 150
Corruption,’ in Lovell, S. Ledeneva, A. V. and Rogachevskii, A. (eds.), Bribery and Blat in Russia, 
London: Macmillan Press Ltd.
 Barsukova “Academic Debates and Russian Reality” 2009 Russian Politics and Law 8 - 27.151
 Treisman, Daniel (2000), ‘The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study’, The Journal of Pub152 -
lic Economics, 76: 399-457.
 Treisman, Daniel (2000), ‘The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study’, The Journal of Pub153 -
lic Economics, 76: 399-457.
 Barsukova “Academic Debates and Russian Reality” 2009 Russian Politics and Law 8 - 27.154
 Barsukova “Academic Debates and Russian Reality” 2009 Russian Politics and Law 8 - 27.155
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All of these (and many other) examples of situations where corruption is all too 
prevalent, are set against a cultural backdrop where giving gifts and gratuities is an 
accepted, and even expected, form of conduct.  Such conduct has long been stan156 -
dard business practice in the country.  The Russian Civil Code contains a glaring 157
contradiction concerning such practices with regards to government officials, allow-
ing nominal gifts to these state and municipal representatives.  158
Anti-corruption legislation implemented in 2009 amended the code to increase the 
permissible value of these gifts from 500 roubles (approximately US$17) to 3 000 
roubles (approximately US$100).  This statutory directive is in direct contrast to the 159
prohibition against accepting gifts (of any value) placed on these officials by the laws 
governing their status. An exception to these latter laws is made for gifts to officials 
at recognised state functions, where such gifts are accepted on behalf of the state 
and considered to be state property.  
In conclusion, it should be noted that there is a fine line between what is considered 
a permissible facilitation payment to a government functionary under the FCPA  to 160
secure the performance of routine governmental actions (for example issuance of a 
permit, license, custom clearance, etcetera) and an impermissible bribe. To further 
 Tumanov, V. A. (1993), ‘Pravovoe nigilizm v istoriko-ideologicheskom rakurst,’ Gosudarstvo i pra156 -
vo, 8.
 Tumanov, V. A. (1993), ‘Pravovoe nigilizm v istoriko-ideologicheskom rakurst,’ Gosudarstvo i pra157 -
vo, 8.
 Frederick Stocker (2011) “New Russian Law Joins a Cavalcade of Recent Anti-corruption Legisla158 -
tion”.
 Federal Laws No 273-FZ, 274-FZ and 280-FZ. 159
 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.160
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complicate matters, the UK Bribery Act  specifically prohibits such facilitating pay161 -
ments. By way of example, the US government has been known to investigate a sig-
nificant number of global companies for potential violations of the FCPA stemming 
from payments to foreign customs officials, including payments made through cus-
toms brokers. 
Even if such payments are deemed to be of a “facilitating” nature within the purview 
of the FCPA’s bribery exception, US publicly traded companies must still ensure that 
the transactions are recorded properly under that statute’s books and records re-
quirements and that proper accounting controls regarding such payments are in 
place.  Clearly, such payments run afoul of the UK Bribery Act’s prohibitions. 162
Whether they are prosecuted in the UK – assuming jurisdictional requirements are 
met – depends on such facts as the magnitude and frequency of the payments; 
whether the payments were premeditated; whether they involved an element of ac-
tive corruption of an official; and if the company had an established policy for dealing 
with such solicitations.  One must remember that in addition to the strictures of US 163
and UK law regarding these payments, the transgressions may now present issues 
with Russian laws. An US company with an UK sales office that bribes a Russian of-
ficial to get business could hit the enforcement pain trifecta.  164
 United Kingdom Bribery Act of 2010.161
 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.162
 United Kingdom Bribery Act of 2010.163
 Frederick Stocker (2011) “New Russian Law Joins a Cavalcade of Recent Anti-corruption Legisla164 -
tion”.
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3 3 Anti-bribery legislation in Russia specifically 
Just prior to becoming President of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev was 
quoted as saying that corruption in his country was having a corrosive effect on civil 
society.  Soon after his election, he made it clear that tackling this problem was 165
foremost on his agenda. In furtherance of that commitment, on July 31, 2008, presi-
dent Medvedev adopted the National Plan for Counteraction to Corruption, which 
outlines numerous objectives for fighting corruption.   166
Enactment of anti-corruption legislation in Russia on January 10, 2009 was a direct 
consequence of that plan.  
The first step toward effectuation of president Medvedev’s National Plan for Coun-
teraction to Corruption came in the form of amendments to existing, albeit less than 
stringent, anti-corruption laws on January 10, 2009 (i e the 2009 legislation).   167
These laws apply to Russian and foreign citizens.  Moreover, if the organisation, 168
preparation, and performance of a corrupt offence is done on behalf or in the interest 
of a “juridical person” (eg a corporation), whether Russian or foreign, such juridical 
persons can be held responsible.   169
The general parameters of the 2009 legislation: The 2009 legislation consisted, in 
 Stocker “Anti-corruption Developments in the BRIC Countries: A MAPI Series” 2012 MAPI 1-70.165
 Frederick Stocker (2011) “New Russian Law Joins a Cavalcade of Recent Anti-corruption Legisla166 -
tion”.
 Federal Laws No 273-FZ, 274-FZ and 280-FZ.167
 Federal Laws No 273-FZ, 274-FZ and 280-FZ.168
 Federal Laws No 273-FZ, 274-FZ and 280-FZ.169
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the main, of three interconnected federal laws , which collectively expand and re170 -
vise Russia’s Criminal, Civil, and Administrative Codes as relating to bribery and cor-
ruption of public officials.  
The term “public officials” includes employees of commercial enterprises if the state 
owns 50% or more of the company. The anti-corruption legislation defines “corrup-
tion” as:  
“(i) an abuse of an official position; the giving or receipt of a bribe; 
Commercial bribery or other unlawful use by an individual of his/her ca-
pacity in contempt of the lawful interest of society and the state with the 
purpose of receiving a benefit in the form of money, valuables, other 
property or services of a monetary nature, (i e pecuniary gain), or other 
proprietary rights for himself or herself or third persons; or unlawful provi-
sion of such benefit to such a person or other individuals; and  
(ii) a new administrative offence for the performance of the actions men-
tioned in (i) above in the name of, or on behalf of, a legal entity. Individu-
als who engage in proscribed activities, according to the 2009 legislation, 
may be punished with a fine of up to 1 million roubles (approximately US
$35 000), an amount equivalent to their income for up to three years, cor-
rective labour for a term of one to six months, or imprisonment for a term 
of up to eight years.”  171
The penalty established for legal entities for such a violation is an administrative fine 
 Federal Laws No 273-FZ, 274-FZ and 280-FZ.170
 Federal Laws No 273-FZ, 274-FZ and 280-FZ.171
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in the amount of up to three times the value of the benefit conferred, but not less 
than 1 million roubles (approximately US$35 000), as well as the seizure of trans-
ferred money, securities, property, etcetera.   It should be noted however that under 172
current president Vladimir Putin, some of these regulations have however been re-
laxed.  173
It is fair to say that the primary focus of the 2009 legislation is upon the activities of 
Russian government officials, not private individuals or corporations.  In this regard, 174
a public official means a Russian citizen who holds a government service post, either 
federal or municipal within the civil, military or law enforcement service sectors that 
involves any professional activity.  Such activity must involve the execution of the 175
powers of federal state bodies, including the constituent regions of the Russian Fed-
eration as established by the Russian Constitution and other relevant federal laws.  176
The definition does not include officials of other countries. For the purpose of the 
anti-corruption laws, the term “public officials” includes employees of commercial en-
terprises if the state owns 50% or more of the total share capital of the company.  177
State and municipal officials are required to disclose their assets, income, and out-
 Federal Laws No 273-FZ, 274-FZ and 280-FZ.172
  The Moscow Times “Putin Signs Law Reducing Penalties for Corruption” http://www.themoscow173 -
times.com/news/article/putin-signs-law-reducing-penalties-for-corruption/517212.html (Accessed 
2015-07-15).
 Federal Laws No 273-FZ, 274-FZ and 280-FZ.174
 Federal Laws No 273-FZ, 274-FZ and 280-FZ.175
 Federal Laws No 273-FZ, 274-FZ and 280-FZ.176
 Federal Laws No 273-FZ, 274-FZ and 280-FZ.177
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standing financial obligations (as well as such information for their spouses and mi-
nor children).   178
The 2009 amendments set clear conflict of interest rules for all state and municipal 
servants. After leaving such government service, individuals are required to disclose 
that past service to any prospective employer if it took place within the previous two 
years.   179
The Russian law also provides absolute immunity from prosecution for disclosure of 
proscribed corruption. Such immunity being conferred is not subject to prosecutorial 
discretion. This concept is referred to as the “effective regret” provision of the Crimi-
nal Code.   For example, a person who makes a disclosure to the authorities out of 180
spite because a promised bribe was not delivered is entitled to immunity from prose-
cution. It does not matter how much time has passed from the corrupt activity until 
the time of disclosure. The passing of the information to authorities, however, must 
be timely, which means that the disclosing individual must actually believe at the time 
of contemplated revelation, that law enforcement or prosecuting authorities have not 
been made aware, or know of, the violation at issue. It does not matter whether the 
authorities do indeed have actual knowledge of the violation as long as the person 
making the disclosure honestly believes that he/she is revealing a situation not pre-
viously known to authorities. Another possible mitigating factor that may absolve 
criminal liability for giving bribes, is when they are made under duress (i e extortion). 
 Federal Laws No 273-FZ, 274-FZ and 280-FZ.178
 Federal Laws No 273-FZ, 274-FZ and 280-FZ.179
 The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation http://www.russian-criminal-code.com (Accessed 180
2015-07-15).
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Commentators have homed in on what many see as shortcomings of the 2009 legis-
lation. Most notably, it did not criminalise the offering of a bribe – it only penalise 
completed bribes.   181
This was a perceived problem because many enforcement actions begin when the 
honest target of a bribe reports that he/she has been approached with an offer.  182
Another point of criticism on these laws is that while targeting official corruption, the 
Russian judiciary is omitted in the description of covered government functionaries. 
Anecdotally, the Russian judiciary is known to be susceptible to bribes in return for 
lax enforcement of Russian law.   183
From the perspective of OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment) Convention obligations, the major shortcoming of the 2009 legislation was 
that Russian criminal law did not prohibit the bribing of foreign government 
officials.  184
With passage of the amendments of the anti-corruption laws on May 4, 2011 (Feder-
al Law No 97-FZ, “On inclusion of changes to the Criminal Code of Russian Federa-
tion and the Code of Administrative Offences in Connection with the Improvement of 
 Russian Regional Economic and Business Atlas Volume 2 Strategic Investment and Business At181 -
las. 
 Russian Regional Economic and Business Atlas Volume 2 Strategic Investment and Business At182 -
las. 
 Russian Regional Economic and Business Atlas Volume 2 Strategic Investment and Business At183 -
las. 
 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions and 184
Related Documents http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf (Accessed 
2014-01-04).
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Government Administration in the Area of Fighting Corruption”), Russia took another 
significant step toward fulfilling the commitment made by President Medvedev in his 
National Plan for Counteraction to Corruption and toward meeting a series of in-
ternational obligations the country has assumed. 
The 2011 legislation made three necessary changes to Russian law. Those changes 
included making it illegal to bribe foreign officials, increasing the statute of limitations 
for foreign bribery committed by legal entities, and significantly increasing the sanc-
tions for both natural and legal persons for the offence of bribery.   185
As previously noted the prior Russian law required an actual transfer of money, se-
curities or other items of value to a government official or to a manager of a com-
mercial or non-profit enterprise in return for an improper benefit for the offence of 
bribery to be committed. The law covered only completed acts of bribery.  
The 2011 legislation,  however, amended the Russian Administrative Code  to 186 187
cover payments “promised or offered” on behalf of legal entities such as corpora-
tions. For commercial or official bribery, or offers or promises to bribe, made on be-
half of or in the interest of companies, the Russian Administrative Code  does not 188
offer an effective compliance program (as is the case with the defence “adequate 
procedures” to prevent bribery recognised in the UK Bribery Act ), or a “facilitating 189
 Russian Regional Economic and Business Atlas Volume 2 Strategic Investment and Business At185 -
las. 
 Federal Laws No 273-FZ, 274-FZ and 280-FZ.186
 Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation No 195-Fz of December 30 2001.187
 Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation No 195-Fz of December 30 2001.188
 Of 2010.189
!58
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
payments” exception (as is the case with the FCPA).  190
The 2011 legislation  created a special statute of limitations for violation of the anti-191
corruption laws, raising the limitations from one year (the default for administrative 
violations) to six years from the date of violation.  192
As indicated earlier, the 2011 legislation  seeked to bring Russian law into con193 -
formity with the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials 
by criminalising bribery of foreign government (non-Russian) officials or officials of 
international public organisations (consistent with both the FCPA and the UK Bribery 
Act ) by Russian nationals.  The Russian administrative law has also been 194 195
changed to make such payments made on behalf, or in the interest of, a legal entity 
(i e Russian companies) a punishable offence.   196
The Russian definition of “foreign official” mirrors the definition used in the OECD 
Convention.  As such, the new law applies to officials at foreign state-owned enter197 -
 Of 1977.190
 Federal Laws No 273-FZ, 274-FZ and 280-FZ.191
 Federal Laws No 273-FZ, 274-FZ and 280-FZ.192
 Federal Laws No 273-FZ, 274-FZ and 280-FZ.193
 Of 2010.194
 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions and 195
Related Documents http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf (Accessed 
2014-01-04).
 Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation No 195-Fz of December 30 2001.196
 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions and 197
Related Documents http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf (Accessed 
2014-01-04).
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prises.  The new law established an offence (both criminal and administrative, re198 -
spectively) for Russian nationals or legal entities for acting as an intermediary in the 
payment or receipt of a bribe, or promising or offering to engage in such a role. The 
2011 legislation  also added further requirements to the “effective regret” provisions 199
of the Criminal and Administrative codes . 200
Immunity seekers must prove that either the bribe was the result of extortion (i e 
duress) or that they voluntarily notified prosecutors or law enforcement of the com-
mission of the offence.  In addition to such voluntary disclosures, those seeking 201
immunity must actively assist the relevant authorities in discovering and/or investi-
gating the offence.  To date there is no clarification as to what such active as202 -
sistance entails. 
The 2011 changes to Russian anti-corruption law significantly up the ante for those 
who are found guilty of such transgressions. As mentioned before, prior to the 2011 
amendments, criminal fines for bribery were capped at one million roubles (approxi-
mately US$35 000). The new law imposes penalties of up to 100 times the amount 
of the bribe, up to 500 million roubles (approximately US$17,5 million).  203
Maximum prison terms for violations have also been increased from eight years to 
 Federal Laws No 273-FZ, 274-FZ and 280-FZ.198
 Federal Laws No 273-FZ, 274-FZ and 280-FZ.199
 Code. Of Administrative Offences. Of The Russian Federation. No. 195-Fz Of December 30, 2001200
 Federal Laws No 273-FZ, 274-FZ and 280-FZ.201
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twelve years for paying a bribe and from twelve years to fifteen years for receiving a 
bribe.   204
Of particular note is the fact that these sanctions for foreign bribery apply both to for-
eign officials who take bribes as well as to Russian bribe-givers. 
Sanctions under the Code of Administrative Offences have also been beefed up. 
Fines for bribery can be as high as 100 times the value of the bribe with no maxi-
mum ceiling.  As intimated, prior to the amendments earlier in 2011, Russian law 205
did not adjust fine calculations based on the magnitude of the bribe at issue. In all 
cases, the fine imposed was up to three times the value of the bribe, subject to a 
minimum amount of one million roubles (approximately US$35 000). 
The law sets forth a three-tiered standard for administrative fines based on the value 
of the bribe.   206
For the first tier level – bribes of one million roubles (approximately US$35 000) or 
less – the previous maximum sanction is maintained (i e up to three times the bribe 
value).  
For the second tier of bribes – in the range of more than one million roubles to 20 
million roubles (i e approximately more than US$35 000 to US$698 000) – the fine is 
up to 30 times the amount of the bribe with a minimum fine of 20 million roubles (ap-
 Federal Laws No 273-FZ, 274-FZ and 280-FZ.204
 Code. Of Administrative Offences. Of The Russian Federation. No. 195-Fz Of December 30, 2001205
 Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation No 195-Fz of December 30 2001 and 206
Federal Laws No 273-FZ, 274-FZ and 280-FZ.
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proximately US$698 000).   207
For the third and highest tier of bribes, the hammer is significantly more burden-
some. For “very large” bribes greater than 20 million roubles, the penalty can be up 
to 100 times the value of the bribe with a minimum amount of 100 million roubles 
(approximately US$3,5 million).  208
While the new Russian anti-corruption law established an absolute maximum crimi-
nal penalty for individuals at the staggering amount of 500 million roubles (approxi-
mately US$17,5 million), there is no comparable cap on the administrative fines that 
can be imposed on corporations, suggesting that the sky is the limit for such penal-
ties. With no maximum cap on the highest tier of fines, one might reflect that fairly 
soon these penalties could amount to real money.  209
In response to growing international efforts against corruption, the 2011 legislation  210
added a new chapter to the Russian Administrative Code  authorising a process for 211
obtaining evidence and requesting other legal assistance from foreign authorities to 
facilitate corruption investigations.  
Undeniably, corruption has been pervasive from the top to the bottom of the Russian 
 Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation No 195-Fz of December 30 2001 and 207
Federal Laws No 273-FZ, 274-FZ and 280-FZ.
 Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation No 195-Fz of December 30 2001 and 208
Federal Laws No 273-FZ, 274-FZ and 280-FZ.
 Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation No 195-Fz of December 30 2001 and 209
Federal Laws No 273-FZ, 274-FZ and 280-FZ.
 Federal Laws No 273-FZ, 274-FZ and 280-FZ.210
 Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation No 195-Fz of December 30 2001.211
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bureaucracy and it is this same bureaucracy that runs the government’s day-to-day 
operations. This will pose a significant hurdle for anti-corruption proponents to over-
come. 
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4 Anti-bribery legislation in India 
4 1 Introduction to India 
Since the turn of the century, India has been recognised as one of the world’s fore-
most emerging economies.  Touted as a future global economic powerhouse, the 212
nation has become a leader in the worldwide community in attracting foreign direct 
investment.  By virtually all accounts, its economy is poised for continued economic 213
prosperity. One lingering threat to this promising potential, however, is corruption.   214
Transparency International ranked the country as the 85th most corrupt nation (out 
of 175) in its 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index.  The index gave India an integrity 215
score of just 3,8 on a scale of 0 to 10, placing it in the same dubious league as Ja-
maica, Thailand and Peru.   216
 ThirdWorldsPlanet.com “The Indian Economy” http://www.thirdworldplanet.com/ (Accessed 212
2014-01-20).
 The India Site “A Brief History of Corruption in India” http://www.theindiasite.com/a-brief-history-of-213
corruption-in-india/ (Accessed 2014-01-01).
 The Diplomat “India’s Anti-corruption Crusades” http://thediplomat.com/2011/06/indias-anti-corrup214 -
tion-crusades/ (Accessed 2014-01-20).
 Transparency International (2014) “Corruption Perception Index” http://www.transparency.org/215
cpi2014.
 Transparency International (2014) “Corruption Perception Index” http://www.transparency.org/216
cpi2014.
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4 2 Corruption culture 
“Merely shouting from the house tops that everybody is corrupt creates an 
atmosphere of corruption. People feel they are in a climate of corruption 
and they get corrupted themselves.”  217
These were the words of Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India and a 
central figure in Indian politics for much of the 20th century, spoken shortly after In-
dia’s independence from British rule.  
The historical antecedents of India’s corruption problems date back to British colo-
nial rule in the so-called “British Raj” period, which began in 1858 when the owner-
ship of the British East India Trading Company was transferred to Queen Victoria’s 
government.   218
Popular resignation about the permanence of corruption is partly explained by the 
political purchase of “corruption” as an idea and a term. Accusations of corruption 
have historically been wielded as a political weapon – a means of tarnishing rivals 
in the right circumstances.   219
A governor-general position was created to rule the country, which was subdivided 
into districts. In effect, these districts were provincial governments controlled by 
commissioners and small executive and legislative bodies. 
 The India Site “A Brief History of Corruption in India” http://www.theindiasite.com/a-brief-history-of-217
corruption-in-india/ (Accessed 2014-01-01).
 Gould Bureaucracy, Community and Influence: Society and the State in India, 1930-1960’s (2011).218
 Gould Bureaucracy, Community and Influence: Society and the State in India, 1930-1960’s (2011).219
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Native Indian citizens were excluded from the governing function. The system was 
marked by elitism and was non-participatory inasmuch as input from the populace 
was barred. Governance was characterised by secrecy – a trait that was perpetuated 
when the country gained its independence in 1947.  This governing practice of em220 -
bracing secrecy was embodied in the Official Secrets Act  which codified the effects 221
of the British Raj and its elitist trappings and served to restrict the flow of information 
between government officials and the citizenry. While ostensibly designed to safe-
guard military and government secrets, the law was hijacked by corrupt officials to 
restrict the flow of information about illicit dealings to the public.  
When India gained independence in the mid-20th century, the new political regime 
(known as the “License Raj”)  was marked by extreme governmental oversight, 222
overregulation, and public ownership of national resources – policies susceptible to 
pervasive corruption and economic malaise.  223
Doing business there came to be marked by complications stemming from red tape 
and confusion.  224
The Indian government’s plethora of economic regulation and oversight had the ef-
fect of restricting competition and brought private industry initiatives to a standstill. 
 The India Site “A Brief History of Corruption in India” http://www.theindiasite.com/a-brief-history-of-220
corruption-in-india/ (Accessed 2014-01-01).
 19 of 1923.221
 Chandra, Mukherjee & Mukherjee India Since Independence (2008).222
 The Economic Times “India is the most over-regulated country in the world” economictimes.india223 -
times.com/ (Accessed 2014-02-01). 
 Aiyar Accidental India: A History of the Nation's Passage through Crisis and Change 2013.224
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With so much power wielded by the government, officials were emboldened to seek 
favours in return for performing their official duties.  Bribing these officials became 225
recognised as the most efficient way to conduct business in India.  226
Over time, corruption became ingrained in the public psyche and accepted as a giv-
en in business dealings, involving practices deemed necessary to avoid administra-
tive bottlenecks. With the opaqueness of India’s governance system, these wrongdo-
ings – while accepted as a part of daily life – have largely gone unreported.  227
The country has witnessed an explosion of bureaucratic and administrative forms of 
corruption taking place at the implementation end of politics, where the public deals 
with a host of functionalities for day-to-day matters. Bureaucratic corruption pervades 
the Indian administrative system with widespread practices of bribery, nepotism and 
misuse of official positions and resources.  At present, some 19,5 million people 228
hold public office in India through central and state governments, quasi-central and 
quasi-state institutions and rural and urban local bodies spread over 200 000 loca-
tions and offices throughout the country.  Since 90% of these officeholders are so-229
called Class III and IV employees, real power is concentrated in the hands of about 
two million public servants who regulate and control many aspects of the daily lives 
 Freedon Works “The Danger of Over-Regulation” www.freedomworks.org/content/danger-over-225
regulation (Accessed 2014-01-04). 
 Aiyar Accidental India: A History of the Nation's Passage through Crisis and Change 2013.226
 Freedon Works “The Danger of Over-Regulation” www.freedomworks.org/content/danger-over-227
regulation (Accessed 2014-01-04). 
 Aiyar Accidental India: A History of the Nation's Passage through Crisis and Change 2013.228
 Hansen A Bottom-up Model of Electricity Reform for Developing Countries: A Case Study of Gu229 -
jarat, India (2008) 58.
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of the vast population.  This minority of civil servants has the potential to indulge in 230
multiple forms of corruption on a scale that paints India as one of the most corrupt 
countries in the world.  
In 1991, India began the process of economic liberalisation and has subsequently 
experienced rapid economic growth and a substantial increase in foreign direct in-
vestment.  A balance of payments crisis at that time opened the door to an In231 -
ternational Monetary Fund program that led to the adoption of a major reform initia-
tive that largely freed up the Indian economy from state control.  
Generally reforms included an opening of the country to international trade and in-
vestment, deregulation, an industrial privatisation effort, tax reform and the imple-
mentation of measures to combat inflation.  Notwithstanding this liberalisation of 232
the economy, corruption has persisted.  In the country today, one still finds numer233 -
ous instances of political and bureaucratic corruption, fraudulent public procurement 
practices and judicial corruption.   234
High-ranking officials have been involved in major corruption scandals. Two of the 
well-known scandals include the 2002-2010 UP Food-grain scam and the 2001 stock 
 Stocker “Anti-corruption Developments in the BRIC Countries: A MAPI Series” 2012 MAPI 1-70.230
 FAO Corporate document repository “The Phenomenal growth of China and India” http://www.231 -
fao.org/docrep/009/ag087e/ag087e05.htm (Accessed 2014-01-15).
 FAO Corporate document repository “The Phenomenal growth of China and India” http://www.232 -
fao.org/docrep/009/ag087e/ag087e05.htm (Accessed 2014-01-15).
 “Transparency International (2014) “Corruption Perception Index” http://www.transparency.org/233
cpi2014 (Accessed 2014-12-11).
 “Transparency International (2014) “Corruption Perception Index” http://www.transparency.org/234
cpi2014 (Accessed 2014-12-11).
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market scam. 
The Uttar Pradesh food-grain scam, also dubbed the “Mother of all scams”, took 
place between the years 2002 and 2010. Grain worth Rs35 000 crore (about US$5 
741 million), meant to be distributed via the Public Distribution System (PDS) to the 
poor under several schemes like Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY), Jawahar Rozgar 
Yojana and Midday Meal Scheme for Below Poverty Line (BPL) card holders, was 
diverted to the open market. Some of it was traced to the Nepal and Bangladesh 
borders, as in 2010 security forces seized Rs1,17 crore (about US$191 929) worth of 
food-grains like paddy and pulses being smuggled to Nepal; another Rs60,62 lakh 
(about US$99 442) worth of grains were confiscated on the Indo-Bangladesh border. 
The scam was first exposed in 2003 in Gonda district, during the distribution of food-
grain meant for the Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana. After initially ordering an 
inquiry into the scam, Mulayam Singh withdrew it. The Special Investigation Team 
(SIT) set up by the Mulayam Singh Government in 2006 lodged over 5 000 First In-
formation Reports (FIRs).  235
In the 2001 Stock Market scam, stock market king Ketan Parekh used Unit Trust In-
dia (UTI), Calcutta Stock Exchange and his own index K-10 to swindle investors. 
When the scam was unearthed, it was reported that he had wiped off over Rs1 lakh 
crore (about US$16 404 210 000) of investor's market capital.  236
Concerning the general perception of the country’s corruption troubles, a 2011 
 Niti Central “25 Corruption scandals that shamed India” http://www.niticentral.com/2013/06/13/25-235
corruption-scandals-that-shamed-india-89069.html (Accessed 2014-01-20).
 Niti Central “25 Corruption scandals that shamed India” http://www.niticentral.com/2013/06/13/25-236
corruption-scandals-that-shamed-india-89069.html (Accessed 2014-01-20).
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KPMG survey of leading Indian corporations painted a distressing picture of typical 
challenges they face because of corruption: 51% of survey respondents fear that ris-
ing corruption will make India less attractive for foreign investment; 68% believe that 
India can achieve more than the projected 9% of GDP growth if corruption is con-
trolled; 68% believe that, in many cases, corruption is induced by the private sector; 
a majority feel that the corruption level in India will remain the same irrespective of 
new legislation; 84% believe that the Indian government has not been very effective 
in enforcing anti-bribery and corruption laws; 90% feel that corruption negatively im-
pacts the performance of stock markets by increasing volatility, and prevents institu-
tional investors from making long-term investments; and 99% feel that the biggest 
impact of corruption on business is the tendency to skew the level playing field and 
attract organisations with a lesser capability to execute projects.  237
4 3 Anti-bribery legislation discussed specifically 
With regards to existing anti-corruption laws, India is recognised as having an institu-
tional framework in place that is largely designed to address the problem in public 
services. This framework is mainly based on colonial laws enacted while India was 
under British control. 
4 3 1 Indian Penal Code 
When it was enacted in 1860, the Indian Penal Code (IPC) incorporated corruption-
related offences. The statute made it illegal for a public servant to accept a bribe, 
and defined “public servant” as “a government employee, officer in the military, 
 KPMG “Leading Indian Firms do not have a corporate responsibility strategy” http://www.kpmg.237 -
com/IN/en/Press%20Release/CR-Survey-Aug-2011.pdf (Accessed 2014-01-01).
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member of the police, judge, officer of the Court of Justice, and any local authority 
established by an act of central or state government”.  238
4 3 2 The Prevention of Corruption Act  239
At present, the primary law in India dealing with corruption is the Prevention of Cor-
ruption Act (POCA), which came into force on September 9, 1988. It incorporated the 
earlier Prevention of Corruption Act , the Criminal Law Amendment Act  and Sec240 241 -
tions 161 to 161-A of the Indian Penal Code (as amended) .  242
The POCA is fairly broad and encompassing, and its primary focus is the curbing of 
corruption within government agencies and by authorities. It widened the coverage of 
existing laws by increasing penalties and expanding the definition of “public servant”. 
In addition to the categories of public servants identified in the IPC, the POCA in-
cludes within its purview any person in the service – or pay – of the government, or 
remunerated by the government by fees or commissions for the performance of any 
public duty. “Public duty” means a duty in the discharge of which the state, the pub-
lic, or the community at large has an interest. The “state” includes a corporation es-
tablished by or under a central, provisional or state act or an authority or a body 
owned, controlled or aided by the government or a government company defined 
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under Section 617 of the Companies Act . Also specifically included as public ser243 -
vants under the POCA, are officeholders with cooperative societies, receiving finan-
cial aid from the government and employees of universities, the Union Public Service 
Commission and banks. 
The POCA’s Sections 7 and 11 prohibit the receipt of illegal gratification by public 
servants. Gratification is not limited to pecuniary gain or rewards estimable in mone-
tary terms. If a public servant takes gratification other than his legal remuneration in 
respect of an official act or to influence public servants, he is liable to a minimum 
punishment of five years of imprisonment plus a fine. The POCA also penalises a 
public servant for taking gratification in return for influencing the public by illegal 
means and for exercising personal influence with a public servant.  
Furthermore, the POCA penalises public servants for accepting something of value 
without paying for it, or paying inadequately for it, from a person with whom he is in-
volved in a business transaction in his official capacity. These latter transgressions 
are punishable by imprisonment from six months to five years and a fine. 
While the POCA’s focus is on the bribe taker (i e the so-called “demand side” of a 
bribery transaction), the bribe payer may be charged under the law with the crime of 
abetment. In respect to the offences outlined supra (found in Sections 7 and 11 of 
the POCA), the payer of illegal gratification is liable as an abettor under Section 12 of 
the statute. Sections 107 to 116 of the IPC provide that “instigation” is considered a 
key element of abetment. As such, the POCA extends to anyone acting as a tout or 
intermediary in the proscribed corrupt act. The law is therefore applicable to private 
citizens who aid and abet in a public servant’s corruption. 
 1956.243
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The relevant consideration to take into account is the state of mind of the private par-
ty when he offers a bribe to a public servant. As soon as that private citizen ap-
proaches a public servant (i e the situation becomes “an instigation”) to receive an 
improper favour, an offence is committed under the POCA, regardless of whether 
that official accepts – or consents to accept – the bribe or whether he was in a posi-
tion to act on the instigation. 
It should be noted that it is necessary to obtain prior approval from the central or 
state government in order to prosecute a public servant under their employ. In the 
case of other officials, prior approval to prosecute must be given by the authority that 
has the power to remove the accused from office.  244
The POCA applies to Indian citizens (including Indian citizens residing abroad) 
across the territory of India. It also applies to foreigners or aliens (i e “non-nationals”) 
abetting illegal transactions within the country’s borders. 
Despite the fact that the POCA has established a legal framework to punish the cor-
ruption of public servants with fines and up to three years in prison, actual punish-
ment for these offences rarely occurs. Not only are the laws frequently ignored by 
those perpetrating the corruption, but they are also ignored by those who are 
charged with the duty of penalising this conduct. The weaknesses of law enforce-
ment in India, compounded with the lack of effort on the part of the criminal justice 
system, has resulted in weak enforcement of the POCA, which in turn has severely 
 University of Iowa College of Law Center for International Finance and Development “The Current 244
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limited the POCA's ability to reduce political corruption.  245
While the language of the POCA addresses the corruption of Indian public authori-
ties, the Act is silent on the major problem of foreign corruption. That is, the POCA 
does not provide for the penalisation of corruption by Indian citizens or corporations 
in international business transactions, nor does it provide for punishment of foreign 
perpetrators of corruption.  
In October of 2003, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly approved the first 
international treaty against corruption. The treaty, called the UN Convention against 
Corruption (UNCAC), requires countries first and foremost to be effective in prevent-
ing corruption. Beyond measures to prevent corruption, the treaty obligates countries 
to criminalise or consider criminalising not only basic bribery but also more compli-
cated and subtle forms of corruption such as the laundering of the proceeds of cor-
ruption and concealment of corruption.  246
An important component of the UN treaty is its call for international cooperation. The 
convention mandates that countries are to provide mutual legal assistance in the in-
vestigation and prosecution of offenders. India signed the UNCAC in December of 
2005, but has not yet ratified the treaty. By signing but not ratifying the treaty, India is 
not legally bound to follow its terms. India has been encouraged to endorse and rati-
fy the treaty to demonstrate its commitment to the fight against corruption, and to re-
 University of Iowa College of Law Center for International Finance and Development “The Current 245
State of India's Anti-corruption Reform: The RTI and PCA” http://blogs.law.uiowa.edu/ebook/con-
tent/uicifd-briefing-paper-no-7-current-state-indias-anti-corruption-reform-rti-and-pca (Accessed 
2014-01-20).
 United Nations Convention against Corruption http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/246
Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf (Accessed 2014-01-20).
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ceive the benefits of the treaty, namely the cooperation of other member states in 
recovering assets that were taken from India by corrupt means.  247
Even before UNCAC, the UN General Assembly had adopted the UN Declaration 
against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions. In this dec-
laration, member states pledged to criminalise the corruption of foreign public offi-
cials. While the declaration is an invitation to member states to adopt the principles 
of the declaration rather than a mandate, the declaration does announce the UN's 
position that countries should criminalise conduct constituting corruption of foreign 
public officials.  248
In 1997, the Organisation for OECD adopted the Convention on Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. The member 
states of the OECD Convention found that the lack of disincentives to foreign bribery 
was a serious international economic problem. Members of the OECD and signato-
ries of the convention agreed to enact laws punishing the bribery of foreign officials. 
To date, India has no laws punishing the corrupt behaviour of Indian citizens abroad. 
According to the OECD, the implications of India and other economically important 
nations abstaining from participation in the convention is a diminution of the conven-
 University of Iowa College of Law Center for International Finance and Development “The Current 247
State of India's Anti-corruption Reform: The RTI and PCA” http://blogs.law.uiowa.edu/ebook/con-
tent/uicifd-briefing-paper-no-7-current-state-indias-anti-corruption-reform-rti-and-pca (Accessed 
2014-01-20).
 United Nations Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transac248 -
tions http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/51/a51r191.htm (Accessed 2014-01-19).
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tion's enforcement in other nation states.   249
4 3 3 The Prevention of Money Laundering Act   250
The Prevention of Money Laundering Act  (PMLA) forms the core of the legal 251
framework in place in India to combat money laundering. The law and rules promul-
gated thereunder came into force on July 1, 2005. PMLA imposes obligations on 
banking companies, financial institutions and intermediaries to maintain a record of 
all transactions of a specified nature, verify the identity of clients, and furnish infor-
mation to the Indian Financial Intelligence Unit. 
The Act states that an offence of money laundering has been committed if a person 
or party to any process connected with the proceeds of crime represents such pro-
ceeds as untainted property.  
“Proceeds of crime” is defined to mean any property obtained by a person as a result 
of criminal activity as related to specific offences listed in a Schedule to the PMLA. A 
person can be charged with a violation of this law only if he has been charged with 
perpetrating such an underlying offence. The penalty for committing a PMLA offence 
is a term of imprisonment between three and seven years plus a significant fine. The 
term of imprisonment can reach ten years if the person is convicted of the underlying 
offence of violating the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act . The Ad252 -
 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions and 249
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judicating Authority, appointed by the central government, shall decide whether any 
of the property attached or seized is involved in money laundering. Any Appellate 
Tribunal is authorised to hear appeals to orders of the Adjudicating Authority. 
4 3 4 The Right to Information Act  253
The Right to Information Act  (RTIA) is a major legislative step in the Indian anti-254
corruption movement. This law, enacted in October of 2005, effectively reverses the 
Official Secrets Act  by forcing public authorities to regularly self-report information 255
about their dealings and also to provide specific information in a timely manner as 
requested by citizens. In addition to facilitating transparency in the duties of all public 
workers, the RTIA can reach private bodies to a limited degree. 
4 3 4 1 Basics of the Act 
With the enactment of the RTIA, citizens of India have a fundamental right to access 
information related to the functioning of their government. The essence of the RTIA 
is that it enables a citizen to examine, review and assess government actions and 
decisions to ensure obedience to public interest, integrity and justice. The Act also 
establishes the government's duty to provide that information. Public authorities must 
not only make access to this information easy and inexpensive, but must also fre-
quently publish certain information without solicitation. The RTIA includes penalty 
provisions for authorities who refuse to release requested information and for those 
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4 3 4 2 Definitions 
4 3 4 2 1 "Information" 
As defined in the RTIA of 2005, the term "information" means any form of material, 
including records, documents, memos, emails, opinions, advices, press releases, 
contracts, papers, samples, logbooks, models, data material in any electronic form 
and information relating to any private body that can be reached by the public au-
thority under any law in force at the time of the request. It is important to note that 
India's RTIA can reach private bodies to a limited extent, as it applies to all bodies, 
"owned, controlled or substantially financed directly or indirectly by funds provided by 
the [...] Government". Under this provision, if a private entity receives financial as-
sistance or subsidies from the government, they may be obligated to provide infor-
mation under the law. Furthermore, the public may access information "relating to 
any private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any other law 
for the time being in force". This means that if a public authority should have ob-
tained information from a private body but has not, the public is entitled to have ac-
cess to that information. For example, if a public official should have obtained a copy 
of a hazardous waste report from a private contractor, but for whatever reason has 
not yet received the copy, that information can be requested under the RTIA. In es-
sence, the public authority's ability to access the document creates a constructive 
right of the citizen to access the document under the RTIA. 
4 3 4 2 2 "Public Authority" 
"Public authority" as defined in the Act means any institution of self-government es-
tablished by any law, notification, or order made by the appropriate government (fed-
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eral, state or local) and also covers "all bodies owned, controlled or substantially fi-
nanced by the government and NGOs substantially financed directly or indirectly by 
the government". This definition of "public authority" is similar to the definition of 
"public official" included in the 1988 POCA.  
Like the POCA definition, the definition of "public authority" in the RTIA is extensive, 
and is meant to include not only public officials in the strict sense of the word, but 
also government contractors, federally funded agencies and other organisations that 
are directly or indirectly financed by the government. This somewhat broad definition 
is meant to encompass a wide range of money handlers, as an attempt to prevent 
misappropriation of government funds and combat the widespread corruption epi-
demic.  
4 3 4 3 Procedure of the Act 
The RTIA is enforced in all Indian states (excluding the state of Jammu and Kashmir 
for reasons of political conflict and accession involving Pakistan) and at all levels of 
government, including central and state administrations and local bodies, as well as 
NGOs.  
The RTIA calls for every public authority to appoint public information officers (PIOs) 
within one hundred days after its enactment. These PIOs should be appointed at 
each sub-divisional or sub-district level. The function of the PIO is to receive applica-
tions for information or appeals as allowed for under the RTIA. In essence, they are 
the custodians of the law. In this respect, the law provides a check on the public au-
thorities by setting up an independent third party to serve as the intermediary be-
tween the citizen and the public authority. 
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The procedure of the RTIA begins when an Indian citizen makes a request to a PIO 
for access to information. A citizen does not have to give a reason for the inquiry. A 
citizen's request triggers the start of a thirty day time period in which a PIO must re-
spond to the request. If the information is not supplied, the citizen has the right to 
appeal to a senior authority from the central or state PIO. If that appeal is denied, the 
citizen may make a second appeal to the Central Information Commission. The Act 
penalises officers who delay the procurement of information or default on their oblig-
ation to provide information not falling under any of the rules’ exceptions. 
4 3 4 4 Criticisms  
While RTIA critics will admit that the act is a huge step toward greater transparency 
and accountability in India, the act has been criticised on several grounds.  
4 3 4 4 1 Lack of publicity will render law useless 
Critics of the law argue that because the act only provides private citizens with the 
right to obtain information, the law will not produce enough results to promote a 
change in the political culture. Critics suggest that corruption scandals will remain 
rampant because:  
4 3 4 4 2 The RTIA allocates power to the average citizen and the average citizen 
lacks the time and resources to uncover corruption; and  
4 3 4 4 3 Public authorities know and exploit the fact that individual private citizens 
have less power. The argument is that Indian citizens lack political clout and confi-
dence in their own knowledge of the legal system and this inadequacy creates a rift 
of power and authority, with the citizen at a disadvantage. However, advocates of the 
RTIA point to the fact that NGOs can obtain information through private citizens and 
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use that information against public officials. If NGOs can use public officials as a 
conduit to obtain information on suspected corruption, the purpose of the act will be 
fulfilled.  256
The RTIA was enacted in order to expose corruption. The intent of the legislators 
was not that all corruption issues would be solved by private citizen inquiries, but that 
with a culture of transparency and accountability, the risks associated with corrupt 
practices would become so great that corruption would not occur. The debate is 
whether the RTIA as it stands can fulfil its promise, given that the private citizen is at 
an disadvantage to the public official in both knowledge of the system and access to 
power.  257
4 3 4 4 4 Too many exemptions 
Even if the RTIA would otherwise scare politicians with the threat of the democratic 
process (i e citizens getting involved and promoting change), critics argue that over-
ly-broad exemptions to the RTIA render the act ineffective in many instances. Critics 
point to several exemptions which contain vague language that under liberal inter-
pretation provides a shield for public authorities against the RTIA's provisions. Some 
overly-vague exemptions include:  
4 3 4 4 4 1 Section 8(1)(h): providing an exemption for information that would impede 
the process or investigation of offenders; 
 University of Iowa College of Law Center for International Finance and Development “The Current 256
State of India's Anti-corruption Reform: The RTI and PCA” http://blogs.law.uiowa.edu/ebook/con-
tent/uicifd-briefing-paper-no-7-current-state-indias-anti-corruption-reform-rti-and-pca (Accessed 
2014-01-20).
 Xindex “India: Right to information and privacy ‘two sides of the same coin’” http://www.indexon257 -
censorship.org/2013/09/indias-right-information-act-colliding-privacy/ (Accessed 2014-01-04).
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4 3 4 4 4 2 Section 8(1)(j): providing an exemption for "information relating to per-
sonal information”, which has no relationship to any public activity or interest; and  
4 3 4 4 4 3 Section 7(9): providing that information will be provided "in the form in 
which it is sought" unless doing so would contribute to the diversion of resources of 
the public authority.   258
4 3 4 4 5 No whistle-blower protection 
The last major criticism of the RTIA is that the act lacks a clause protecting whistle-
blowers from retaliation by the powerful institutions they are capable of bringing 
down. India does not have a statute protecting whistle-blowers in any capacity, and 
critics believe this provides a major disincentive for those with important information 
about corruption to come forward.  
The rationale for protecting whistle-blowers according to proponents of an amend-
ment to the RTIA or supplementary legislation is that, in order for potential whistle-
blowers to feel safe bringing critical information to the attention of investigators, they 
should be statutorily protected. Critics argue that, in a democratic society, the goal 
should be to make the act of whistle-blowing the responsibility of all citizens. Howev-
er, these duties cannot be expected of average citizens without the state in turn of-
fering practical legal protection to those citizens.  
Because the RTIA pits individual citizens against powerful companies and political 
institutions, critics suggest that amending the statute to protect whistle-blowers from 
harmful retaliation would encourage inquiries under the act and ensure the act's suc-
 Xindex “India: Right to information and privacy ‘two sides of the same coin’” http://www.indexon258 -
censorship.org/2013/09/indias-right-information-act-colliding-privacy/ (Accessed 2014-01-04).
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cess against corruption.  259
4 3 5 The Foreign Contribution Regulation Act  260
The Foreign Contributions (Regulation) Act  (FCRA) which came into force on May 261
1, 2011, replaces (the previous) The Foreign Contributions (Regulations) Act . The 262
objective of this law is to regulate the way certain Indian individuals, associations, or 
companies accept and utilise foreign funds and to prevent foreign entities from inter-
fering in the Indian political, decision-making, and opinion-forming process. The act, 
with both national security and anti-corruption objectives, bars a range of Indian per-
sons/entities from accepting foreign contributions or foreign “hospitality”, including 
electoral candidates, members of the media (for example newspaper correspon-
dents, contributors, publishers), civil servants, members of the judiciary, legislators 
and political parties and/or officeholders of political parties, and organisations of a 
political nature. Certain payments, such as salaries or disbursements in the ordinary 
course of business, or payments in the course of international commerce, are not 
prohibited. Also exempt are funds received by legitimate non-government organisa-
tions engaged in development activities and payments Indians receive from relatives 
abroad. The law’s definition of “foreign contribution” includes any articles/currency as 
well as any securities as defined in relevant sections of the Securities Contracts 
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(Regulation) Act , and the Foreign Exchange Management Act . Persons receiv263 264 -
ing proscribed payments face punishment of up to five years of imprisonment. 
The new FCRA has national scope, applying to the whole of India as well as to Indi-
an citizens outside the country, and to foreign associate branches or foreign sub-
sidiaries of Indian companies and bodies. Whoever accepts or assists another per-
son in accepting a foreign contribution in contravention of the FCRA or any rules de-
veloped thereunder, can be imprisoned for up to five years. Similarly, a person who 
receives a permissible foreign contribution cannot transfer those funds to another 
unless the transferee is an authorised recipient under the act. When a company, 
firm, society or association commits an offence under the FCRA, those in charge of 
or responsible to that entity would also be deemed guilty of the violation unless they 
can establish that they had exercised due diligence to prevent the crime.  265
As for banks and financial institutions, the new law creates certain reporting obliga-
tions with regard to these financial contributions. The nature and source of such for-
eign remittances must be disclosed to authorities. While the FCRA represents an in-
tention to enforce greater accountability with regards to funds flowing into India, it 
does nothing with regards to funds flowing from the country to foreign officials or into 
opaque overseas investment assets that are held by Indian nationals. 
 1956.263
 1999.264
 “The Foreign Contribution Regulation Act, 2010 — An analysis” http://www.bcasonline.org/articles/265
artin.asp?973 (Accessed 2015-07-11).
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4 3 6 The Lokpal Debate 
On January 30, 2011, thousands of citizens marched in New Delhi to protest against 
corruption and to demand an anti-corruption law and the passage of an effective 
Lokpal bill  (Ombudsman’s bill).  266 267
The basic idea of a Lokpal is to provide for the filing of complaints of corruption 
against ministers and members of parliament. This popular demonstration was the 
precursor of a dramatic movement that has swept the country and engaged anti-cor-
ruption activists from all walks of Indian life. Perhaps the signature event of the rapid-
ly growing movement – which has captured global attention – was the fasting and 
arrest of 74 year old Anna Hazare. Mr Hazare, a former army officer, has been fight-
ing against the endemic corruption in India’s political establishment for years, though 
his anti-corruption crusade seems to have resonated with his countrymen in 2011. 
Best-selling Indian writer Chetan Bhagat described this phenomenon in the following 
manner: 
“(T)housands of non-government organisations fight for social causes 
every day in India, but none has ever achieved this kind of support. From 
rickshaw drivers to software engineers, from businessmen to spiritual 
leaders, people from all walks of life. After a relatively short fast in the 
spring, Mr Hazare forced the government into including his civil society 
 The Indian government’s Lokpal Bill, 2011 is available at www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Lokpal/266
The%20Lok%20Pal%20 Bill%202011.pdf.
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movement into the drafting of a new anti-corruption bill.”  268
In 2010, the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) released the final draft of the Indi-
an National Anti-Corruption Strategy,  a governmental initiative aimed at creating a 269
legal and regulatory anti-corruption framework and strengthening existing institutions 
to combat corruption. This draft legislation was expected to increase the role of insti-
tutions such as the CVC, Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), Controller and Audi-
tor-General as well as various other anti-corruption agencies. It is likely to address 
political and administrative corruption, as well as corruption within the private 
sector.   270
This idea of a Lokpal bill  is not new. Such a measure was previously introduced on 271
eight occasions – in 1968, 1971, 1977, 1985, 1989, 1996, 1998 and 2001  – in the 272
Indian Parliament but failed to become law. In 1985 the bill was withdrawn after in-
troduction and the other seven lapsed upon dissolution of the respective Lok Sabha 
 Chetan Bhagat, “Anna Hazare’s Fight for Change has Inspired Millions of Indians,” The Guardian, 268
August 17, 2011, www. guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/17/anna-hazare-arrest-inspired-indians.
 In 2010, the CVC released the final draft of the Indian National Anti-Corruption Strategy, a gov269 -
ernmental initiative aimed at creating a legal and regulatory anti-corruption framework and 
strengthening existing institutions to combat corruption. The document is available at http://
cvc.nic.in/NationalAntiCorruptionStrategydraft.pdf.
 In 2010, the CVC released the final draft of the Indian National Anti-Corruption Strategy, a gov270 -
ernmental initiative aimed at creating a legal and regulatory anti-corruption framework and 
strengthening existing institutions to combat corruption. The document is available at http://
cvc.nic.in/NationalAntiCorruptionStrategydraft.pdf.
 The Indian government’s Lokpal Bill, 2011 is available at www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Lokpal/271
The%20Lok%20Pal%20 Bill%202011.pdf.
 Chetan Bhagat, “Anna Hazare’s Fight for Change has Inspired Millions of Indians,” The Guardian, 272
August 17, 2011, www. guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/17/anna-hazare-arrest-inspired-indians.
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(House of the People, the lower house of the Indian Parliament) before they were 
considered by the Rajya Sabha (Council of States, the Upper House of Indian Par-
liament). Notwithstanding the input of Anna Hazare’s movement, the draft Lokpal 
Bill,  which the government introduced earlier in 2011, was widely viewed as a cha273 -
rade.  At issue was the scope of the ombudsman’s authority. 274
In essence, the government’s proposal kept the prime minister (PM), the judiciary 
and the conduct of members of parliament outside the ambit of the new anti-corrup-
tion watchdog; in fact, the proposal covered less than 0,5% of Indian officials. Mr 
Hazare’s supporters have derisively referred to the government’s proposal as the 
“joke pal bill”.  They advocate a strong ombudsman that will have the power to in275 -
vestigate corruption charges against the PM, senior judges, and the MPs, amongst 
others. The government countered that such sweeping powers would contravene the 
allocation of government authority under the Indian Constitution and added that in 
most constitutional democracies, top leaders are shielded against such investiga-
tions. Mr Hazare’s supporters ended up drafting their preferred version of a law in 
what is known as a Jan Lokpal (Citizens’ Ombudsman) bill.  276
The arguments in favour of the broader Jan Lokpal bill  are that it would deal with 277
 The Indian government’s Lokpal Bill, 2011 is available at www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Lokpal/273
The%20Lok%20Pal%20 Bill%202011.pdf.
 Law Resource India http://indialawyers.wordpress.com/tag/lokpal/page/2/ (Accessed 2014-01-09).274
 Law Resource India http://indialawyers.wordpress.com/tag/lokpal/page/2/ (Accessed 2014-01-09).275
 The Jan Lokpal Bill, 2011 is available at http://ibnlive.in.com/news/full-text-the-jan-lokpal-bill/276
148401-53.html.
 The Jan Lokpal Bill, 2011 is available at http://ibnlive.in.com/news/full-text-the-jan-lokpal-bill/277
148401-53.html.
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the country’s pervasive corruption problem by creating a necessary independent 
ombudsman body outside of government control with the power to investigate com-
plaints against politicians and public servants, without the need to get prior govern-
ment approval. Its proponents believe that such a measure would be effective in re-
dressing citizens’ grievances and deterring corruption.  278
The draft Jan Lokpal bill  would create an institution called “Lokpal” at the central 279
government level and Lokayuktas in each state with similar authority. Like the Indian 
Supreme Court and Election Commission, these new entities would be completely 
independent of government and no minister or government official would be able to 
influence their investigations. It would merge the CVC and the anti-corruption branch 
of the CBI into the Lokpal, and this institution would have the complete power – and 
machinery – to independently investigate and prosecute any official, judge or politi-
cian. Investigation in any case would have to be completed within one year and any 
ensuing trials wrapped up within another year As such, corrupt politicians, officials, or 
judges would be punished within two years. Any losses to the government attributed 
to persons guilty of corruption would be recouped at the time of conviction. If work 
that is required to be done by an official on behalf of a common citizen is not com-
pleted within the prescribed time, the Lokpal would impose financial penalties on the 
offending official, and the amount would be given as compensation to the prevailing 
complainant. Lokpal members would be selected by judges, citizens and constitu-
tional authorities – not politicians – through a completely transparent, participatory 
 Law Resource India http://indialawyers.wordpress.com/tag/lokpal/page/2/ (Accessed 2014-01-09).278
 The Jan Lokpal Bill, 2011 is available at http://ibnlive.in.com/news/full-text-the-jan-lokpal-bill/279
148401-53.html.
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process.   280
The functioning of the Lokpal/Lokayuktas would also be completely transparent. 
Complaints against their officials would become investigations and be resolved with-
in two months.  Finally, for the first time under Indian law, protection would be af281 -
forded to whistle-blowers.  It would be the duty of the Lokpal to provide protection 282
to those who might be victimised by calling attention to corruption.   283
As the government moved forward with its bill, Anna Hazare again began a hunger 
strike in August 2011 and was arrested by authorities.  The resulting public clamour 284
prompted the government to agree to more flexibility on these contested issues. Both 
Houses of Parliament adopted a nonbinding “sense of the House”, agreeing to con-
sider some of the key issues raised by Mr Hazare.  This agreement came in the 285
form of a thumping of desks as opposed to actual votes. Mr Hazare ended his fast 
and eventually left official custody.  286
The newest news on the Lokpal issue came on 13 February 2015 when Deputy 
 Law Resource India http://indialawyers.wordpress.com/tag/lokpal/page/2/ (Accessed 2014-01-09).280
 The Jan Lokpal Bill, 2011 is available at http://ibnlive.in.com/news/full-text-the-jan-lokpal-bill/281
148401-53.html.
 Law Resource India http://indialawyers.wordpress.com/tag/lokpal/page/2/ (Accessed 2014-01-09).282
 Law Resource India http://indialawyers.wordpress.com/tag/lokpal/page/2/ (Accessed 2014-01-09).283
 Chetan Bhagat, “Anna Hazare’s Fight for Change has Inspired Millions of Indians,” The Guardian, 284
August 17, 2011, www. guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/17/anna-hazare-arrest-inspired-indians.
 Chetan Bhagat, “Anna Hazare’s Fight for Change has Inspired Millions of Indians,” The Guardian, 285
August 17, 2011, www. guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/17/anna-hazare-arrest-inspired-indians.
 Law Resource India http://indialawyers.wordpress.com/tag/lokpal/page/2/ (Accessed 2014-01-09).286
!89
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chief Minister-designate Manish Sisodia, AAP (Aam Aadmi Party) said that the Lok-
pal Bill  is likely to be brought to the assembly in its second sitting.   287 288
 The Indian government’s Lokpal Bill, 2011 is available at www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Lokpal/287
The%20Lok%20Pal%20 Bill%202011.pdf.
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5 Anti-bribery legislation in China 
5 1 Introduction to China 
There has been a general perception in the global business community that corrup-
tion has presented a problem to doing business in China.  Indeed, it is not unusual 289
to hear foreigners with commercial ties to China say that corruption there is in-
escapable, with a climate where personal relationships (guanxi) are often critical to 
sealing a deal.  Sectors requiring extensive government approval have posed par290 -
ticular issues in this regard, including banking, finance, government procurement, 
and construction.  The lack of an independent press, and the fact that the entities 291
responsible for conducting corruption investigations are controlled by the Communist 
Party, both hamper anti-corruption activities.  
Prior to the 2011 amendment of China’s anti-corruption laws, the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) had various laws prohibiting both commercial and official bribery.  
Commercial bribery involves actions taken by individuals or companies that amount 
to unfair competition. Official bribery deals with payments made to a Chinese state 
functionary in return for a benefit. Such bribery of foreign government officials was 
not covered prior to the 2011 amendment.  
The term “state functionary” is broadly construed to include individuals who fit the 
 Transparency International (2014) “Corruption Perception Index” http://cpi.transparency.org/289
cpi2014/results/ (Accessed 2014-12-11).
 Chambers “Guanxi: What is it and Why is it Important?” Dragon Business Network (2010-03-30).290
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traditional notion of government officials, who perform public services in a state-
owned enterprise or civil organisation, who are assigned by state authorities to per-
form public services in a non-state-owned enterprise, and who otherwise perform 
public services pursuant to law.  292
The fact that many major industries in the PRC are state-owned or state-controlled 
means that the number of people qualifying as government functionaries for official 
bribery purposes have exponentially increased in China. 
Three government entities and one Communist Party organ are responsible for tar-
geting corruption within the country. The Supreme People’s Procuratorate and Min-
istry of Public Security investigate criminal violations of the anti-corruption laws, 
while the Ministry of Supervision and the Communist Party Discipline Inspection 
Commission enforce ethics guidelines and party discipline. Corrupt officials are first 
investigated by the Discipline Inspection Commission, which gathers extrajudicial ev-
idence and decides whether to strip the official of party membership and hand the 
case over to the judicial system. Anti-corruption drives to date have seldom targeted 
foreign firms. China’s National Audit Office also inspects accounts of state-owned 
enterprises and government entities. 
It is fair to say that until relatively recently China’s efforts to combat domestic corrup-
tion have concentrated mainly on cracking down on Chinese officials that accepted 
bribes.  This demand-side focus represented a somewhat uneven application of the 293
 Chambers “Guanxi: What is it and why is it Important?” Dragon Business Network (2010-03-30).292
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PRC’s domestic bribery law.  
The key Chinese statutory provisions dealing with official bribery are articles 385 and 
389 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China.  Pursuant to the rele294 -
vant provisions of article 385, it is illegal for any “state functionary” to extort or accept 
“money or property” from another person in return for securing benefits. 
Correspondingly, pursuant to the terms of article 389, it is illegal for a person to give 
money or property to a public official in return for a benefit.  295
Violators of articles 385 and 389 are generally subject to fines and imprisonment 
based on the value of the involved bribe and the seriousness of the 
circumstances.  296
Individuals who give or offer money or property to public servants to obtain “unjust 
benefit” can face up to three years of criminal detention. Public servants who solicit 
or accept bribes will have any illegally gained property confiscated and face penal-
ties that vary based on the monetary value of the bribe, ranging from simple adminis-
trative fines (when the bribery is relatively minor and involves an amount of not more 
than 5 000 Yuan) to life imprisonment or death (in the event of serious violations in-
volving sums greater than 100 000 Yuan).  
Entities that violate article 389  are also subject to fines based on the value of the 297
bribe. If the prospect of fines and imprisonment do not put potential miscreants on 
 2011.294
 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China of 2011.295
 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China of 2011.296
 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China of 2011.297
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notice that the PRC’s anti-corruption enforcement priorities are on officials accepting 
bribes, notable cases where the government has meted out more draconian sen-
tences certainly will.  
5 2 Corruption culture 
In May 2007, Zheng Xiaoyu, the former head of China’s food and drug administra-
tion, received a death sentence for dereliction of duty and accepting $850 000 in 
bribes in exchange for approving a drug that had not undergone necessary testing. 
The medicine was later found to have been responsible for several deaths. Mr 
Zheng’s sentence was carried out within two months of being rendered. Mr Zheng’s 
deputy, Cao Wenzhuang, also received a capital sentence, but was given a two-year 
stay (a move often preceding a commutation of the death penalty to life in prison).  298
Other more recent examples drive home the seriousness of the government’s crack-
down on official corruption. In August 2009, the chairman of a state-owned airport 
holding company was put to death after being convicted of corruption in the taking of 
more than £11 million in bribes.   299
In July 2010, the Chinese executed Wen Qiang, a former top justice official in the city 
of Chongqing, was convicted of a variety of corruption charges, including accepting 
bribes. At the time, Mr Wen was the highest ranking PRC state functionary brought 
to justice in the country’s anti-corruption campaign. The high profile investigation 
 “China food safety head executed” BBC News (2007-07-10).298
 Mail Online “Former Beijing airport chief executed for stealing £11m” http://www.dailymail.co.uk/299
news/article-1204990/Former-Beijing-airport-boss-executed-guilty-corruption.html#ixzz3gahxtV1j .
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leading to his death sentence involved the prosecution of some 100 local officials.  300
One final example of the seriousness with which PRC officials view state corruption 
was demonstrated in May 2011 and involved the China-centred aspect of the 
Siemens bribery scandal. In this case, an intermediate court in Henan rendered a 
death sentence for a China Mobile executive named Shi Wanzhong for bribery (Chi-
na Mobile is state-owned). He was granted a two year reprieve. Tian Qu, who facili-
tated the bribe, was sentenced to a 15 year prison term. The court determined that 
Mr Shi and Mr Tian had accepted a total of US$5,1 million in bribes from Siemens.  301
Prior to the 2011 amendment, two PRC laws prohibited commercial bribery – article 
8 of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law (AUCL) and article 164 of the Criminal Law . 302
Article 8 of the AUCL prohibits business operators from “giving bribes in the form of 
property or other means for the purpose of selling or purchasing products.” The State 
Administration for Industry & Commerce (SAIC) enforces the AUCL.   303
According to article 2 of the SAIC Provisional Rules of Prohibition of Commercial 
Bribery Activities , commercial bribery is defined as “an activity by which a business 304
operator bribes the other party to the transaction, either an entity or an individual, in 
the form of property or other means for the purpose of selling or purchasing prod-
 Reddy “Chinese Justice Chief is executed for crimes” The Wall Street Journal (2010-07-08).300
 “China Mobile executive gets death in bribery case” China.org.cn (2011-06-21).301
 1979.302
 1979.303
  Decree No 60, SAIC Provisional Rules of Prohibition of Commercial Bribery Activities.304
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ucts”.  305
Under article 20 of the AUCL, violators of article 8 may be investigated and held li-
able to those who have suffered as a result of the bribery at issue.  Moreover, arti306 -
cle 22 of the AUCL provides that such violators shall be investigated pursuant to the 
PRC Criminal Law.   307
Article 164 of the Criminal Law – the other PRC law relevant in terms of commercial 
bribery – makes it unlawful for one to offer “money or property to the staff of a com-
pany or enterprise in order to make illegitimate benefits.”   308
The consequences for violating this provision are graduated according to the amount 
of money or property offered. Any person found to be in violation of article 164 “shall 
be sentenced to a fixed term of imprisonment” of not more than three years or crimi-
nal detention if the amount involved is deemed “relatively large”.  If the amount in309 -
volved is found to be “huge”, the person committing the violation “shall be sentenced 
to fixed term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than 10 years 
and shall also be fined”.  An entity committing an article 164 violation “shall be 310
fined”, and the “persons who are directly in charge and other persons who are direct-
ly responsible for the crime shall be punished” as if they personally committed the 
  Decree No. 60, SAIC Provisional Rules of Prohibition of Commercial Bribery Activities.305
 1979.306
 1979.307
 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China of 2011.308
 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China of 2011.309
 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China of 2011.310
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crime.  Article 164 provides for leniency if the perpetrator voluntarily reports the vio311 -
lation before an investigation has been initiated.  312
As intimated supra, the primary focus of PRC bribery law before the 2011 amend-
ment was on punishing state functionaries for their related corrupt acts. There are, 
however, signs of an increased concentration on commercial bribery. For example, in 
2009, four employees of the British-Australian mining conglomerate Rio Tinto were 
prosecuted in China for obtaining business secrets by improper means and taking 
commercial bribes. The company supplies significant quantities of iron ore to the 
PRC, and its implicated employees were found to have accepted bribes from several 
Chinese steel companies in return for securing iron ore contracts. Their individual 
sentences spanned between seven and 14 years, including a 10 year stint in a Chi-
nese prison for Stern Hu, an Australian national that served as the company’s legal 
representative in its Shanghai office. He was also fined 1 million Yuan.  313
While some private corporations and individuals have been prosecuted under Chi-
na’s strict anti-corruption laws, the government’s enforcement priority has been on 
integrity-challenged domestic officials. The jurisdiction of China’s criminal law is 
rather broad. It applies to all Chinese citizens (whether they are located within the 
PRC or elsewhere), natural persons of any nationality located within the PRC, and all 
companies, enterprises, and institutions that are organised under PRC law.  
Generally speaking, this includes – in addition to PRC companies – Sino-foreign joint 
 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China of 2011.311
 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China of 2011.312
 Pierson “China charges four employees of outside mining company with bribery, theft” Los Ange313 -
les Times (2010-02-11).
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ventures, wholly owned foreign enterprises (WOFEs), and foreign companies with 
representative offices in China. 
5 3 Anti-bribery legislation in China  
On February 25, 2011, the PRC legislature, the National People’s Congress, passed 
a slate of some 49 amendments (the Eighth Amendment) to the country’s criminal 
law. These changes took effect on May 1, 2011.  One of those amendments (article 314
29, the 2011 amendment) criminalises, for the first time under PRC law, paying 
bribes to foreign government officials (i e non-PRC government officials) and to offi-
cials of international public organisations.  315
The 2011 amendment to China’s anti-corruption laws is a model of brevity.  The 316
amendment adds a second provision to article 164 of the criminal law. It reads in its 
entirety as follows: 
“Whoever, for the purpose of seeking illegitimate commercial benefit, 
gives money or property to any foreign public official or official of an in-
ternational public organisation shall be punished in accordance with the 
provisions of the preceding paragraph [for instance the pre-existing article 
164 as described above in conjunction with the discussion of commercial 
bribery].”  317
 Stocker “Chinese Amend Anti-Corruption Laws to Criminalize Bribery of Foreign Officials” https://314
www.mapi.net/system/files/LAR-507_0.pdf.
 Stocker “Chinese Amend Anti-Corruption Laws to Criminalize Bribery of Foreign Officials” https://315
www.mapi.net/system/files/LAR-507_0.pdf.
 Stocker “Anti-corruption Developments in the BRIC Countries: A MAPI Series” 2012 MAPI 1-70.316
 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China of 2011.317
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The penalty for violations of the amendment are the same as those previously in ex-
istence, and the jurisdictional reach – as expanded for foreign officials – remains the 
same.  The amendment does not contain any affirmative defences, exceptions, or 318
exemptions from the pre-existing provisions of article 164.  319
Interestingly, the 2011 amendment was not inserted into the “Graft and Bribery” 
chapter of the PRC Criminal Law, covering corruption of public officials, but in the 
“Crimes against the Order of Socialist Market Economy” chapter , dealing with 320
“commercial bribery” (for instance the offence of actively bribing non-public 
officials).  While this placement seems unusual, it is consistent with China’s obliga321 -
tion under the United Nations Convention against Corruption to prosecute bribery of 
foreign officials where the purpose of the payment is to secure an advantage in the 
conduct of international business.  Moreover, by stating that the purpose of the 322
bribe should be the receipt of an “illegitimate commercial benefit”, the amendment 
suggests that an offence will only be committed when the object of the bribe is of a 
 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China of 2011.318
 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China of 2011.319
 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China of 2011.320
 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China of 2011.321
 Article 16.1 of the UN Convention against Corruption provides in pertinent part that:  322
“Each State Party shall adopt such legislation and other measures as may be necessary to estab-
lish as a criminal offense, when committed intentionally or the promise, offering or giving to a for-
eign public official or an official of a public international organization, directly, indirectly, of an un-
due advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official 
act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties, in order to obtain or retain 
business or other undue advantage in relation to the conduct of international business.” 
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commercial nature.  323
By enacting this legislation, China joins a growing list of countries providing criminal 
sanctions for bribery of foreign officials by either individuals or private entities.  The 324
new law, however, is short on specifics.  As such, it will afford prosecutors broad 325
discretion, and the government’s enforcement priorities will determine the types of 
conduct that will probably result in liability under the new law. It is currently unclear 
whether the Chinese government will issue interpretive guidance before prosecu-
tions begin. It seems likely that, as with other areas of the criminal law, the Supreme 
People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate will issue interpretive guidance. 
Neither the existing nor the amended PRC criminal law defines the meaning of the 
phrase “illegitimate commercial benefit”. This term in the 2011 amendment may also 
be translated as “seeking illicit interests” or “seeking improper advantages”.  On 326
November 20, 2008, however, the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme Peo-
ple’s Procuratorate issued a joint opinion, in the context of PRC commercial bribery 
laws, entitled “Opinions on Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Handling 
of Commercial Bribery Cases” (the Opinion). This Opinion might well be instructive in 
determining the meaning of this term. It explains that the term “seeking illegitimate 
benefit” means that the briber “seeks any advantage in breach of laws, regulations, 
 Stocker “Chinese Amend Anti-Corruption Laws to Criminalize Bribery of Foreign Officials” https://323
www.mapi.net/system/files/LAR-507_0.pdf.
 Background on the UN Convention against Corruption, including a link to the convention, is avail324 -
able at www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html. 
 Stocker “Chinese Amend Anti-Corruption Laws to Criminalize Bribery of Foreign Officials” https://325
www.mapi.net/system/files/LAR-507_0.pdf.
 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China of 2011.326
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rules, or policies” or requires the other party to provide assistance or facilitation that 
is in breach of laws, regulations, rules, policies, or industry codes of practice.  327
The qualifying word “commercial” could be interpreted to have the effect of narrowing 
the broader term “illegitimate benefit”, meaning that some activities that are illegal in 
a domestic context might be permissible when the target of the payment is a foreign 
official – for instance, a payment to a foreign official in return for a non-commercial 
benefit.  Even with the qualifier, if any guidance is offered from the Opinion’s defini328 -
tion of “illegitimate benefit”, the term “illegitimate commercial benefit” is likely to be 
construed quite broadly.  The 2011 amendment may very well be read as criminal329 -
ising the making of bribes to foreign officials in return for any commercial advantage.  
Neither the 2011 amendment nor the existing PRC criminal law defines the term 
“property”.  A Chinese source, however, sheds some light on this matter.   330 331
The aforementioned Opinion stated that with regard to PRC commercial bribery law, 
the term “money or property” includes not only money and property in kind, but also 
any property interest that can be quantified in monetary terms, such as the provision 
of home decoration, membership cards having monetary value, token cards with 
 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China of 2011.327
 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China of 2011.328
 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China of 2011.329
 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China of 2011.330
 Zhang “The New Frontier of Chinese Legal Horizon” http://rjglb.richmond.edu/wp-content/uploads/331
2013/03/rgl_10-4.pdf.
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cash worth, and travel expenses.  332
Additionally, a regulation related to commercial bribery issued in 1996 by SAIC de-
fined property broadly to include: cash and cash in kind, including properties offered 
by a business operator to a counter party entity or individual, for purpose of sale or 
purchase of commodities, disguised as a promotional fee, publicity fee, sponsorship 
fee, research fee, labour fee, consulting fee, commission, etcetera, or by way of re-
imbursement of various fees.  333
Neither the 2011 amendment nor any other PRC laws define the term “foreign public 
official”.  Indeed, it appears that the amendment is the first PRC criminal law to use 334
the term. It is not illogical to expect that the Chinese might look to a treaty to which 
they are a signatory for definitional guidance on this matter. Article 2 of the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption provides in that regard as follows: 
“‘Foreign Public Official’ shall mean any person holding a legislative, ex-
ecutive, administrative or judicial office of a foreign country, whether ap-
pointed or elected; and any person exercising a public function for a for-
eign country, including a public agency or public enterprise.”   335
The 2011 amendment to China’s criminal law is not unlike laws of other jurisdictions 
 Zhang “The New Frontier of Chinese Legal Horizon” http://rjglb.richmond.edu/wp-content/uploads/332
2013/03/rgl_10-4.pdf.
 Decree No 60, SAIC Provisional Rules of Prohibition of Commercial Bribery Activities.333
 Zhang “The New Frontier of Chinese Legal Horizon” http://rjglb.richmond.edu/wp-content/uploads/334
2013/03/rgl_10-4.pdf.
 United Nations Convention against Corruption http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/335
Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf (Accessed 2014-01-20).
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that prohibit bribery of foreign government officials, such as the United States For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act  and the UK Bribery Act . The intent of all such laws is 336 337
straightforward; that is to prevent individuals and companies from gaining unfair 
business advantages by paying bribes to such officials. Unlike most of those other 
statutes, however, the 2011 amendment does not contain any exceptions, exemp-
tions or affirmative defences.  It lacks detail as to contingencies that have posed 338
interpretive problems in enforcing other jurisdictions’ anti-bribery laws, such as how 
hospitality and entertainment costs are to be handled; whether small, non-discre-
tionary payments to secure performance of routine governmental actions are per-
missible; what types of foreign officials are covered by the new law; whether ex-
penses directly related to sales promotion, including travel and accommodation 
costs, are allowable; whether employees of state-owned enterprises are “foreign 
government officials” and whether officials with foreign non-governmental organisa-
tions are “officials” of an “international public organisation” and whether having an 
effective anti-bribery compliance program is a defence for a corporate entity whose 
employee engages in the proscribed activity.  339
The 2011 amendment gives both PRC and non-PRC companies another cause for 
concern when doing business in China. Non-PRC companies that are partners in 
joint ventures, have formed other business entities organised under Chinese Law, or 
 1977.336
 2010.337
 Zhang “The New Frontier of Chinese Legal Horizon” http://rjglb.richmond.edu/wp-content/uploads/338
2013/03/rgl_10-4.pdf.
 Zhang “The New Frontier of Chinese Legal Horizon” http://rjglb.richmond.edu/wp-content/uploads/339
2013/03/rgl_10-4.pdf.
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have representative offices in China, are now for the first time subject to the risk of 
liability under PRC Criminal Law for bribing non-PRC government officials.  
The effectiveness of the 2011 amendment will depend on its enforcement.  There is 340
every indication that the Chinese government and ruling Communist Party, which at 
its core is focused on social stability, are serious about combating corruption. As de-
tailed supra, the government has been stepping up its fight against both commercial 
and official domestic bribery, even expanding enforcement for foreign individuals and 
companies. By bringing its criminal law into conformance with its international treaty 
obligations – that is, including coverage for bribery of foreign officials – China seems 
poised to further demonstrate its commitment against corruption. 
Another indication of the Chinese government’s anti-corruption focus is found in its 
rhetoric. In late 2013, the Information Office of the State Council of China published 
a report on the country’s efforts entitled “China’s Efforts to Combat Corruption and 
Build a Clean Government”.  341
The report provides an overview of the PRC’s anti-corruption activities since the 
state’s inception in 1949. While admitting that corruption persists, the report touts the 
country’s successes in trying to eradicate the problem. The State Council report cites 
a study showing that from 2003 to 2010, Chinese citizens’ rate of satisfaction with 
“the work of combating corruption and building a clean government” rose dramatical-
ly from 51,9% to 70,6%. Among other notable statistics, the report said that from 
 Zhang “The New Frontier of Chinese Legal Horizon” http://rjglb.richmond.edu/wp-content/uploads/340
2013/03/rgl_10-4.pdf.
 “China’s Efforts to Combat Corruption and Build a Clean Government” http://unpan1.un.org/in341 -
tradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan043696.pdf. (Accessed 2013-02-02).
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2003 to 2009, Chinese authorities filed more than 240 000 cases of embezzlement, 
bribery, dereliction of duty and infringement of rights.   342
Moreover, in 2009 alone, 3 194 people were criminally punished for offering bribes. 
Since 2005 (until 2009), when China was said to have launched a special anti-
bribery campaign, more than 69 200 cases of commercial bribery were reported to 
have been “investigated and dealt with”.  343
The report also dwells upon what it refers to as China’s “Education in Clean Gov-
ernment and Construction of the Culture of Integrity” efforts.  Along with its en344 -
forcement focus, China is said to have taken preventative efforts to “promote the cul-
ture of integrity” throughout society. Finally, the report stresses the PRC’s commit-
ment to international cooperation or related issues, noting that the country has en-
tered into 106 judicial assistance treaties with 35 countries, and established the Chi-
na-US Joint Liaison Group on Law Enforcement Cooperation. The article noted that 
historically, the Chinese have concentrated their domestic anti-bribery efforts on cor-
rupt officials accepting pay-outs, and neglected targeting foreign companies who 
bribed those officials. By contrast, the article noted that the United States govern-
ment has been more active than China in bringing bribery charges against United 
States companies making bribes in China. The article intimated that the climate has 
changed and the Chinese government is stepping up its enforcement of foreign enti-
 “China’s Efforts to Combat Corruption and Build a Clean Government” http://unpan1.un.org/in342 -
tradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan043696.pdf. (Accessed 2013-02-02).
 “China’s Efforts to Combat Corruption and Build a Clean Government” http://unpan1.un.org/in343 -
tradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan043696.pdf. (Accessed 2013-02-02).
 “China’s Efforts to Combat Corruption and Build a Clean Government” http://unpan1.un.org/in344 -
tradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan043696.pdf. (Accessed 2013-02-02).
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ties and persons making bribes in China as well as outside of the country in cases 
where the jurisdictional requirements of the 2011 amendment are satisfied.  345
 “China’s Efforts to Combat Corruption and Build a Clean Government” http://unpan1.un.org/in345 -
tradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan043696.pdf. (Accessed 2013-02-02).
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6 Anti-bribery legislation in South Africa  
6 1 Introduction to South Africa 
South Africans are of the opinion that public sector corruption is getting worse. 
Transparency International's 2014 global Corruption Perception Index shows that 
South Africa has dropped over thirty places since 2001. This country is currently 
ranked at number 67 out of 175 countries with a score of 4,4.  346
The Human Sciences Research Council's (HSRC) annual South African Social Atti-
tudes Survey shows the proportion of people who think that tackling corruption 
should be a national priority almost doubling, from 14% to 26%, in the five year peri-
od between 2006 and 2011.  347
This trend is supported by the latest 2013 Afrobarometer report, titled “Governments 
Falter in Fight to Curb Corruption”, released on November 13, 2013. This report, 
based on surveys of 51 000 people in 34 African countries, demonstrates that South 
Africa is one of the countries where there is a notable increase in public perceptions 
that corruption is getting worse, particularly since 2008. This is in contrast with coun-
tries such as Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Senegal and Zambia, where people 
believe that their governments are making gains in curbing public sector 
corruption.  348
 Transparency International (2014) “Corruption Perceptions Index” http://cpi.transparency.org/346
cpi2014/results/. (Accessed 2015-07-01).
 Human Science Research Council “South African Attitudes Survey” http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/de347 -
partments/sasas (Accessed 2014-05-07).
 Afrobarometer “Afrobarometer Report 2013” http://www.afrobarometer.org/ (Accessed 348
2014-05-07).
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6 2 Corruption culture 
Interestingly, South Africa is better placed than many other African countries to tackle 
this problem. There are thirteen public sector agencies that have a particular legal or 
policy role to play in combatting graft. Moreover, a number of national mechanisms – 
such as the National Anti-Corruption Task Team – have been established to coordi-
nate the functions of these agencies. South Africa also has dedicated policies, stan-
dards and legislation specifically designed to enable the state to tackle corruption 
through both criminal and civil action. 
The question then arises, why, with all these resources available to tackle corruption, 
do South Africans perceive the government to be failing in this regard? For example, 
Afrobarometer has found that on average a little over half (56%) of the people on the 
African continent thought that their governments were doing a poor job in “their ef-
forts to fight corruption”. However, South Africa performed notably worse than the 
average, with two out of three citizens (66%) believing the government to be per-
forming poorly in combatting graft.  349
Importantly, these opinions are not held because South Africans are regularly con-
fronted with public sector corruption. In fact, the 2013 Afrobarometer report shows 
that South Africa was ranked fifth lowest among African countries when it came to 
citizens having direct experiences of paying a bribe for public services.  350
Only 15% of South Africans said that they had paid a bribe in the previous year com-
 Afrobarometer “Afrobarometer Report 2013” http://www.afrobarometer.org/ (Accessed 349
2014-05-07).
 Afrobarometer “Afrobarometer Report 2013” http://www.afrobarometer.org/ (Accessed 350
2014-05-07).
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pared to an average of 30% of Africans who had paid a bribe. The worst performer 
was Sierra Leone, where 63% admitted that they had paid a bribe.   351
So why do South Africans have such negative perceptions of corruption? 
Arguably, it is because although most people are not expected to pay a bribe to ac-
cess a public service, the public are aware that politicians and public officials divert 
public funds away from service delivery for personal gain. In 2011 the former head of 
the Special Investigation Unit, Willie Hofmeyer, reported before parliament that be-
tween R25 billion and R30 billion was lost to the government procurement budget 
each year due to this type of fraud.  352
Moreover, there is evidence that incidents of corruption are increasing. A report by 
Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs, currently South Africa’s largest law firm, based on 
documented fraud and malfeasance cases presented to parliament and contained in 
Public Service Commission reports, found that the amount involved increased from 
R130 million in the 2006/07 financial year to over R1 billion in 2011/12.  353
There is thus evidence that the heart of the problem lies in the lack of accountability 
for maladministration and corruption. Corruption Watch, a non-profit organisation that 
provides a platform for the public to report corruption, states that this problem starts 
 Afrobarometer “Afrobarometer Report 2013” http://www.afrobarometer.org/ (Accessed 351
2014-05-07).
 Woods Anti-corruption Reader (Unpublished, available on request; Woods 2011. Anti corruption 352
legislation - a failed response to procurement corruption. 
Paper presented to the Public Procurement Regulation in Africa Conference, Stellenbosch, South 
Africa.
 Powell Steven, ENS Forensics (Pty) Ltd “The Procurement fraud risk to local government”. IMFO – 353
Autumn 2008 20.
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with the president. While there are various efforts by the government to tackle cor-
ruption, “these actions were countered by the continuing impunity on the part of 
those who were politically and financially powerful”. In particular, it was explained 
that the "Gupta wedding saga and on-going fiasco surrounding the president's pri-
vate Nkandla residence are indicators in the past year of impunity in operation". Little 
symbolises the nature of this public sector corruption challenge better than the scan-
dal of the R246 million in tax payers’ money being diverted away from the public to 
upgrade president Jacob Zuma's private homestead.  354
Unsurprisingly, research data supports the argument that corruption committed by 
politicians and government officials is driving negative public perceptions of corrup-
tion in South Africa.  355
According to the 2013 Afrobarometer survey, perceptions of the office of the presi-
dent being corrupt more than doubled – from 13% in 2002 to 35% in 2011.  This 356
finding is backed up by the latest Future Fact Survey released that showed “a mas-
sive slide in trust and confidence in president Zuma to a current score of 37 from a 
high of 257 five years ago”.  357
 Woods Anti-corruption Reader (Unpublished, available on request); Woods 2011. Anti-corruption 354
legislation – a failed response to procurement corruption. 
Paper presented to the Public Procurement Regulation in Africa Conference, Stellenbosch, South 
Africa.
 Woods Anti-corruption Reader (Unpublished, available on request); Woods 2011. Anti-corruption 355
legislation – a failed response to procurement corruption. 
Paper presented to the Public Procurement Regulation in Africa Conference, Stellenbosch, South 
Africa.
 Afrobarometer “Afrobarometer Report 2013” http://www.afrobarometer.org/ (Accessed 2014-05-7).356
 Future Fact “Future Fact Survey” http://www.futurefact.co.za/.357
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The phenomenon of corruption has captured the attention of South Africans that are 
committed to good governance. Good governance is reflected in terms of value dri-
ven perspectives which manifest itself in effective, legitimate, democratic govern-
ment and high levels of institutionalisation or combinations of supra. The negative 
consequences of corruption represent only one side of the argument, but any focus 
on corruption must be coupled with an equivalent focus on the positive side of good 
governance. 
Corruption is especially harmful in developing countries such as South Africa due to 
the fact that these countries tend to have fewer resources and need to use these 
scarce resources in the most effective way, as well as the fact that there is a lack of 
confidence in the government.  358
6 3 Anti-bribery legislation discussed specifically 
Written law and formal law enforcement are essential components of effective sys-
tems for combating corruption.  Such law in South Africa includes: 359
6 3 1 The Public Service Act  360
Amongst other things this act deals with misconduct of “a person employed in terms 
of the act who accepts, without the necessary permission, or demands in respect of 
 Kroukamp “Corruption in South Africa with particular reference to Public Sector Institutions: The 358
Evil of all Evils 2006 Journal of Public Administration 206 – 217.
 Woods Anti-corruption Reader (Unpublished, available on request; Woods 2011. Anti-corruption 359
legislation – a failed response to procurement corruption. 




Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
carrying out or the failure to carry out his or her duties, commission, fees or pecu-
niary or other reward not being due to him or her in respect of his or her duties”. 
6 3 2 The Public Service Regulations 
These regulations, which flow from the act supra, give an obligation to any official 
employed in terms of the Public Service Act  to report to appropriate authorities any 361
acts of fraud, corruption, nepotism, maladministration and any other act which consti-
tutes an offence, or which is prejudicial in the public interest.  
6 3 3 The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act  (replaced Cor362 -
ruption Act 94 of 1992) 
On April 27, 2004 South Africa’s Corruption and Combating of Corrupt Activities 
Act  (PCCAA) came into operation, with the intention of bolstering South Africa’s 363
fight against corruption. The PCCAA must be seen in the context of the Prevention of 
Organised Crime Act of 1998,  the Financial Intelligence Centre Act of 2001,  the 364 365
SADC Protocol against Corruption, the African Union Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption  and recent legislative measures by the United Nations 366
aimed at tackling “white-collar-crime”. The PCCAA, which is surely a sign of increas-
ing awareness of the threat of corruption, also aims to implement the obligations of 
 1994.361
 Act 12 of 2004.362
 Act 12 of 2004.363
 Act 121 of 1988.364
 Act 38 of 2001.365
 2003.366
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South Africa under the United Nations Convention against Corruption  adopted by 367
the General Assembly on 31 October 2003.  368
6 3 3 1 This, as the primary anti-corruption act in South Africa, contains the following 
important provisions: 
6 3 3 1 1 Extends the legal definition of what constitutes a corrupt practice (i e it 
widens the net), and provides harsh sentences (including life imprisonment); 
6 3 3 1 2 Establishes that any person who directly or indirectly “accepts, agrees, or 
offers to accept gratification” from any other person to benefit himself or another per-
son, is guilty of the crime of corruption.  
MTHIYANE DP explaines: 
“[9] The first element (acceptance) is self-explanatory and does not re-
quire any elucidation. As for the second element (gratification) it is said to 
include ‘money, whether in cash or otherwise’. The third element (induce-
ment) depends on whether receipt of the gratification is directed at procur-
ing the recipient to act in one or more of the ways as set out in the sub-
section. I have dealt with ‘unlawfulness’. Just as with ‘unlawfulness’, ‘in-
tention’ referred to in (e) above, is not specifically mentioned in the defini-
tion section of the PCCA Act but the definition must be construed as re-
quiring intention. The recipient must have the required intention at the 
moment he receives the gratification. Snyman says: 
‘[I]ntention always includes a certain knowledge, namely knowledge of the 
 2003 by Resolution 58/4.367
 Burchell & Milton Principles of Criminal Law 3 ed (2005) 890 – 930.368
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nature of the act, the presence of the definitional elements and the unlaw-
fulness. A person has knowledge of a fact not only if she is convinced of 
its existence, but also if she foresees the possibility of the existence of the 
fact but is reckless towards it; in other words she does not allow herself to 
be deterred by the possibility of the existence of such fact. She then has 
intention in the form of dolus eventualis.”  369
6 3 3 1 3 Establishes that it is also a crime to offer or receive any form of gratification 
not earned; 
6 3 3 1 4 Establishes that the person who makes the offer or inducement to another 
to commit a corrupt practice is also guilty of an offence; 
6 3 3 1 5 Establishes that if a person offers to perform a corrupt service for another, 
he or she will be guilty of the crime of corruption; 
6 3 3 1 6 Criminalises corruption in the private sector; 
6 3 3 1 7 Places a duty on managers and directors in both the private and public sec-
tors to report corrupt colleagues and employees, and if they fail to do so, jail sen-
tences can be imposed on them; 
6 3 3 1 8 Provides that public officials who are obviously living beyond their means 
may be investigated and prosecuted (the “unexplained wealth” clause); 
6 3 3 1 9 Criminalises corrupt practices by South Africans on foreign soil. South 
Africans who corrupt foreign public officials may be prosecuted for corruption in 
South Africa; 
6 3 3 1 10 Establishes a blacklist of businesses and business people who have been 
guilty of corrupt practices. They may not tender for state contracts for between five 
 Selebi v S (240/2011) [2011] ZASCA 249; 2012 (1) SA 487 (SCA); 2012 (1) SACR 209 (SCA); 369
[2012] 1 All SA 332 (SCA) (2 December 2011).
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and ten years; 
6 3 3 1 11 Makes any member of a legislative authority who directly or indirectly ac-
cepts or agrees or offers to accept gratification from another person guilty of corrup-
tion; 
6 3 3 1 12 Targets judicial officers and members of prosecuting authority guilty of 
corrupt practices; 
6 3 3 1 13 Provides for seizure, after judicial processes, of property used in the 
commission of corrupt practices or which are the proceeds of corruption. Cash or 
funds may also be seized; and  
6 3 3 1 14 Compels companies to report all corruption greater than R100 000. 
6 3 4 The Prevention of Organised Crime Act  replaces The Proceeds of Crime 370
Act (76 of 1966).  
This Act does the following: 
6 3 4 1 Introduces measures to combat organised crime;  
6 3 4 2 It prohibits money laundering;  
6 3 4 3 It prohibits and criminalises certain gang activities;  
6 3 4 4 It prohibits certain activities relating to racketeering; 
6 3 4 5 It makes it obligatory to report certain information; 
6 3 4 6 It provides for the recovery of the proceeds of unlawful activity; and 
6 3 4 7 It provides for the civil forfeiture of criminal assets that have been used to 
commit an offence, or assets that are the proceeds of unlawful activity.  
 Act 121 of 1998.370
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6 3 5 The Protected Disclosures Act  (aka “The Whistle-blowers’ Act”) 371
Whistle-blower type law has been introduced in many countries especially over the 
past 10 years. As such there is much commonality of approach between countries in 
this regard. For example, this act draws heavily on the UK’s Public Interest Disclo-
sure Act.  The more usual provisions would:  372
6 3 5 1 Protect employees in both the public and private sectors from discrimination 
in circumstances where they blow the whistle on corruption; and 
6 3 5 2 Encourage honest and concerned employees to report wrongdoing within 
their workplace without fear. 
6 3 6 The Financial Intelligence Centre Act  (FICA)  373
This Act establishes a Financial Intelligence Centre and a Money Laundering Adviso-
ry Council in order to:  
6 3 6 1 Combat money laundering activities, the financing of terrorist and related ac-
tivities; and 
6 3 6 2 Impose certain duties on persons or institutions that might be used for money 
laundering or financing of terrorist related activities. 
This act was amended and expanded upon by way of the Financial Intelligence Cen-
 Act 26 of 2000.371
 Woods Anti-corruption Reader (Unpublished, available on request); Woods 2011. Anti-corruption 372
legislation – a failed response to procurement corruption. 
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tre Amendment Act of 2008. This included changing the name of the Money Laun-
dering Advisory Council to the Counter-Money Laundering Advisory Council. 
The Financial Intelligence Centre has the mandate and obligation to establish an ef-
fective policy and compliance framework and operational capacity to oversee com-
pliance and to provide high quality, timeous financial intelligence for use in the fight 
against crime, money laundering and terrorist financing.  
6 3 7 The Promotion of Access to Information Act   374
This act is to give effect to the constitutional right of access to any information held 
by the state and any information that is held by another person and that is required 
for the exercise or protection of any rights. 
6 3 8 The Investigations of Serious Economic Offences Act   375
This act dealt with the investigation of economic offences, whether committed by 
government officials or members of the public, and with the reporting to prosecuting 
authorities for matters which have to go to court. The act also gave necessary inves-
tigative powers to the office established under this act.  
6 3 9 The Public Finance Management Act  (PFMA)  376
This act governs and regulates the management of public monies and public assets 
across all national and provincial government institutions. The act: 
 2004.374
 Act 117 of 1999.375
 Act 1 of 1999.376
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6 3 9 1 Modernises the systems of financial management within government organs; 
6 3 9 2 Gives public sector managers the responsibility and authority to play a more 
rigorous and purposeful management role; 
6 3 9 3 Ensures the production of timely, accurate and relevant information; and 
6 3 9 4 Reduces waste and corruption concerning state finances and other assets.  
This is achieved through the act introducing financial management facilities such as: 
A modern performance system, internal controls, risk management, accrual account-
ing, best procurement practice, a sanctions regime, treatment of unauthorised, irreg-
ular and wasteful expenditure, a strong legal and regulatory financial management 
framework, a clear basis for capacity building and training, well-defined institutions of 
governance and accountability arrangements, and a wide-ranging quality information 
and reporting facility.  377
6 3 10 The Municipal Finance Management Act  (MFMA)  378
This act governs and regulates the management of public monies and public assets 
within the municipal sphere of government throughout the country. Similar intentions 
as these expressed in the PFMA supra are contained in this act. In addition, the act 
includes interventions that may be carried out where a municipality is deemed to be 
experiencing serious administrative failures.  
It is clear from above that South Africa has a comprehensive anti-corruption legisla-
 Woods Anti-corruption Reader (Unpublished, available on request); Woods 2011. Anti-corruption 377
legislation – a failed response to procurement corruption. 
Paper presented to the Public Procurement Regulation in Africa Conference, Stellenbosch, South 
Africa.
 Act 56 of 2003.378
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tive environment. 
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7 Conclusion 
There is a tendency by many people to seek dishonest and undeserved advantage 
at the expense of others. It is a situation which, to some degree or another, is preva-
lent in all societies and which, given emerging attitudes of entitlement and material-
ism, is likely to remain a serious problem across the world.   379
As a sociological phenomenon it is increasingly understood for its disruptive and dis-
torting effects on the quality of many innocent peoples’ lives. The phenomenon is 
generally known as “corruption” and comprises a range of unethical activities which 
pervade and transverse both the commercial sector and the public sector of a given 
country, with the latter situation having greater standards of living consequences for 
the general public.   380
The general sense of alarm has grown since the 1980’s in keeping with the mounting 
incidences of reported cases of corruption and the accompanying realisation of the 
consequences this has on the general well-being of a society.   381
This in turn leads to anxious speculation regarding the consequences on any country 
which does not do the necessary to curb these tendencies. Against this we’ve seen 
 Woods Anti-corruption Reader (Unpublished, available on request); Woods 2011. Anti-corruption 379
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the tentative emergence of researchers and practitioners from across a range of rel-
evant disciplines that produce thinking on how to better understand corruption and its 
various manifestations, and how to combat the perceived causes of this corruption. 
In recent years we have seen a wide range of counter-corruption initiatives and prac-
tices which propose to restore an improved morality in the workplace, but evidence 
to date indicates that such approaches have had limited success and in many in-
stances have even failed to reduce the incidence of corruption and to change the 
environment in which it thrives.  
From the discussion it is clear that corruption is not only a critical threat to the deliv-
ery of basic services and good governance, but it also hampers development and 
impedes growth initiatives and diverts resources from where they are needed. While 
good governance refers to the ideal of any government, corruption is a scourge that 
any government needs to combat as it destroys good governance.   382
7 1 Consequences of corruption 
High levels of corruption can become self-perpetuating as corruption tends to feed 
on itself once it realises a certain level of incidence. Once the environment becomes 
characterised by a loss of ethical standards, the combination of a compelling need 
for individuals to satisfy their own personal financial and material interests, the op-
portunities to do so, and the absence of sufficient deterrents not to do so, can raise 
the levels of corrupt behaviour to a point where a broad culture of corruption devel-
ops – to the severe detriment of an entire country.  
 Van Niekerk & Olivier “Enhancing anti-corruption strategies in promoting good governance and 382
sound ethics in the South African public sector” 2012 Tydskrif vir Christelike Wetenskap 131 – 156. 
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Such levels of corruption have serious consequences for any country. These conse-
quences and costs to a country, or even to a specific community, are usually difficult 
to measure but evidence without doubt shows this ultimately has a negative bearing 
on the living standards of the more socio-economically vulnerable people – which 
usually constitute the majority of a country’s citizens, especially in the case of a de-
veloping country.   383
Consequences can be listed as: 
7 1 1 Private investment deterrent 
It reduces investment and, as a consequence, reduces the rate of growth. Such re-
duction in investment is assumed to be caused by the higher costs and the uncer-
tainty that corruption creates.  384
7 1 2 It lowers employment 
By deterring fixed investment and making it more costly to do business or start new 
businesses.  385
7 1 3 It negatively affects the inflation and exchange rates 
Depending on the extent of the corruption and which industries, products, etcetera 
dominate a particular country’s economy, prices can be caused to rise in the case of 
importing and the exchange rate can, as a result, be influenced. The suppliers of 
goods and services can increase their prices so as to include the bribes they have to 
 Tanzi Corruption around the world: causes, consequences, scope and cures (1998) 559..383
 Mauro The Quarterly Journal of Economics (1995) 681-712.384
 Tanzi Corruption around the world: causes, consequences, scope and cures (1998) 559.385
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pay.  386
7 1 4 It harms international trade 
It reduces foreign direct investment because corruption has the same effect as a tax, 
and in fact operates as a tax. The less predictable the level of corruption (the higher 
its variance), the greater is its impact on foreign direct investment. A higher variance 
makes corruption behave like an unpredictable and random tax. Thus, increases in 
corruption and in its unpredictability are equivalent to increases in the tax rate on en-
terprises.   387
7 1 5 It reduces GDP growth 
For almost all of the reasons given supra, economic growth can be negatively affect-
ed, meaning fewer taxes and less government services.   
7 1 6 It influences and distorts consumption patterns 
Where corruption is widespread a significant number of wealthy people can be un-
naturally introduced into a society who then buys and imports expensive and luxury 
goods and properties. This increases the wealth distribution disparity and affects 
consumption patterns.  388
 Tanzi Corruption around the world: causes, consequences, scope and cures (1998) 559.386
 Wei & Zeckhauser Dark deals and dampened destinies: Corruption and economic performance 387
(1999) 443-454.
 Woods Anti-corruption Reader (Unpublished, available on request); Woods 2011. Anti-corruption 388
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7 1 7 It leads to resource misallocations 
Resources can be allocated so as to take advantage of corruption rather than in 
terms of supply and demand.   389
7 1 8 It harms a country’s international reputation 
Many businesses are simply not prepared to pay bribes or to get involved in corrupt 
activities in any way. This includes many of the world’s biggest companies. As such, 
these companies will avoid doing business in a country where they are likely to be 
put under pressure to do so. This affects both trade and investment.  390
7 1 9 It reduces competition, efficiency and innovation across the economy 
Where some firms seek the benefits that can be derived from corruption – for  exam-
ple being awarded tenders – other more honest firms, notwithstanding their pricing 
and quality of product, will be marginalised causing a reduction in competition, effi-
ciency and innovation. Furthermore, corrupt tendering often results in the awarding 
of contracts to incompetent companies at an excessive cost.  391
7 1 10 It biases the allocations of talent and capital 
For reasons already explained, talent and capital might not be employed in areas 
 Tanzi Corruption around the world: causes, consequences, scope and cures (1998) 559.389
 Barsukova “Academic Debates and Russian Reality” 2009 Russian Politics and Law 8 - 27.390
 Barsukova “Academic Debates and Russian Reality” 2009 Russian Politics and Law 8 - 27.391
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where they could otherwise contribute optimally towards the economy.   392
Each and every one of the consequences of corruption mentioned supra is known to 
exist, not least through a wide range of case studies. Their undermining effect on 
public sectors around the world has also been witnessed. The listing of the more 
proven of these consequences helps to show just how wide and pervasive corruption 
can become if not combated in an effective way. As indicated at the beginning of this 
section, these various corrupt situations are highlighted as situations which have a 
broad “macro” effect on a country.  
7 2 Where legislation fits in 
The PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2009 Crime Survey observed three factors to be 
commonly found where fraud occurs. Firstly, the would-be perpetrators need an in-
centive or motive to engage in an act of corruption. Secondly, there needs to be an 
opportunity to commit the act. Thirdly, and less central to the act, is the fact that per-
petrators are usually able to rationalise their actions.   393
Contemplate the issue of opportunity for a moment: If opportunity were to be ham-
pered, corruption will necessarily not take place and all consequences mentioned 
supra will not happen. Therefore, a strong and modern legal framework addressing 
the causes of corruption (as stated in introductory remarks) together with relevant 
 Woods Anti-corruption Reader (Unpublished, available on request); Woods 2011. Anti-corruption 392
legislation – a failed response to procurement corruption. Paper presented to the Public Procure-
ment Regulation in Africa Conference, Stellenbosch, South Africa.
 PriceWaterHouseCoopers “PriceWaterhouseCoopers Global Crime Survey 2009” http://www.pw393 -
c.co.za/en_ZA/za/assets/pdf/pwc-sa-global-economic-crime-survey-nov-2009.pdf.
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statutory institutions, are essential dimensions to hamper opportunity.   394
The BRICS, as it will have been noted, are equipped with such laws and institutions. 
However, the test for all countries, but especially for developing countries, is based 
on the integrity of the criminal justice system upon which the effectiveness of this law 
relies.  Crucial to this integrity is the absolute independence of the judiciary, its eth395 -
ical standing, as well as that of the law enforcement agencies. This in turn necessi-
tates these two agencies being fully and properly capacitated and supported.  396
7 3 Why BRICS 
As mentioned in Chapter 1 it is estimated that by 2027 BRICS countries will overtake 
the G7 countries. The BRICS are in a similar stage of economic development. This 
group represents a huge economic power shift from the developed G7. Therefore 
these countries’ economic wellbeing is of paramount importance to the economic 
development of the world. 
All emerging markets, including Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, em-
body potential profits for investors. They also, however, bear greater risks than de-
veloped economies because they come with a degree of ambiguity, as their envi-
ronments provide for a lot of flexibility in policy and legal interpretation. A compre-
 Rose-Ackerman The Political economy of corruption  46 http://www.iie.com/publications/chapter394 -
s_preview/12/2iie2334.pdf (Accessed 2014-11-03).
 Woods Anti-corruption Reader (Unpublished, available on request; Woods 2011. Anti-corruption 395
legislation – a failed response to procurement corruption.Paper presented to the Public Procure-
ment Regulation in Africa Conference, Stellenbosch, South Africa.
 Masiloane & Dintwe “Developing an Anti-Corruption Strategy for the South African Public Sector” 396
2014 Journal for Public Administration 180 – 198.
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hensive understanding of specifically anti-bribery legislation in these countries will 
therefore contribute to a greater understanding of legislative ambiguities and positive 
legislative trends experienced in the BRICS and lead to the implementation of 
“strong legislation” as mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
7 4 Strong legal framework 
It can be inferred that characteristics that make anti-corruption legislation successful 
are detection, investigation and prosecution of cases while punishment, prevention 
and enforcement aspects are imperative for effective anti-corruption laws. While hav-
ing anti-corruption legislation in place has proven to be the first step, there are, how-
ever, other complementary measures necessary, such as informed citizens, a need 
to foster and sustain high levels of professional and ethically imbued civil servants 
and legislation that supports the transition towards a corruption-free society.  397
For purposes of this thesis, what is considered to be a strong legal framework is leg-
islation directly addressing the causes of corruption. After taking a look at all current 
laws and laws to be implemented in the various BRICS countries and after assessing 
all critics’ opinions, it can safely be deduced that what is considered a strong legal 
framework in order to curb corruption (and therefore bribery) is the following: 
7 4 1 Comprehensive definition  
As stated earlier in this chapter a strong definition of “corruption” and specifically 
“bribery” is needed as many people do not understand these concepts, and one 
 Majila, Taylor & Raga “A comparative analysis of the implementation of anti-corruption legislation 397
by anti-corruption agencies in the provinces of the Eastern and Northern Cape” TD The Journal for 
Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa (2014) 219 – 240.
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cannot refrain from wrongdoing if you did not know that it is considered questionable 
behaviour.  398
7 4 2 Clearly defined oversight body 
The act/law should have a clearly defined overseeing body as one notes the criticism 
of the Brazilian Access to Information Law.    399 400
7 4 3 Well-equipped enforcement authority 
All laws will come to no effect if the enforcement authority is ill-equipped, as one 
sees in Russian Federal Laws No 273-FZ, 274-FZ and 280-FZ. The PGO is under-
staffed and lacking expertise and effective legal instruments to investigate sophisti-
cated bribery schemes, particularly of the transnational variety. The other important 
ingredient in Gary Becker's analysis is the probability that those who commit crimes 
would get caught. This leads to the role of institutional controls. The existence of 
these controls reflects to a large extent the attitude of the political body toward this 
problem. Generally, the most effective controls should be those that exist inside insti-
tutions. This is really the first line of defence. Good and transparent procedures 
should make it easier for these offices to exercise their controls.  401
 Chêne “International good practice in anti-corruption legislation” 2010 U4 Expert Answer 1 - 9.398
 Act 12.527 of 2011.399
 Majila, Taylor & Raga “A comparative analysis of the implementation of anti-corruption legislation 400
by anti-corruption agencies in the provinces of the Eastern and Northern Cape” TD The Journal for 
Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa (2014) 219 – 240.
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7 4 4 Protection of whistle-blowers 
The reporting of a crime (whistle-blowing) is usually the first line of defence in any 
business fraud prevention, therefore comprehensive whistle-blowing protection is 
needed – see Russian Federal Laws No 273-FZ, 274-FZ and 280-FZ and the RTIA 
in India. The rationale for protecting whistle-blowers according to proponents of an 
amendment to the RTIA or supplementary legislation is that, in order for potential 
whistle-blowers to feel safe bringing critical information to the attention of investiga-
tors, they should be statutorily protected. Critics argue that, in a democratic society, 
the goal should be to make the act of whistle-blowing the responsibility of all citizens. 
However, these duties cannot be expected of average citizens without the state in 
turn offering practical legal protection to those citizens. 
7 4 5 Publicity 
7 5 5 1 The RTIA is a perfect example of where a state allocates power to the aver-
age citizen and the average citizen lacks the time and resources to uncover corrup-
tion and will therefore hamper the effective working of the act. 
7 5 5 2 The RTIA is of effect on Indian citizens. The argument is that Indian citizens 
lack political clout and confidence in their own knowledge of the legal system and 
this inadequacy creates a rift of power and authority, with the citizen at a disadvan-
tage.  402
7 4 6 Exemptions 
Beware of too many exemptions (RTIA as reference) and vague exemptions. Even if 
 Masiloane & Dintwe “Developing and Anti-Corruption Strategy for the South African Public Sector” 402
2014 Journal for Public Administration 180 – 198.
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the RTIA would otherwise scare politicians with the threat of the democratic process 
(that is citizens getting involved and promoting change), critics argue that overly-
broad exemptions to the RTIA render the act ineffective in many instances. Critics 
point to several exemptions which contain vague language that under liberal inter-
pretation provides public authorities with a shield from the RTIA's provisions. Some 
overly-vague exemptions include:  
7 4 6 1 Section 8(1)(h): providing an exemption for information that would impede the 
process or investigation of offenders; 
7 4 6 2 Section 8(1)(j): providing an exemption for "information relating to personal 
information”, which has no relationship to any public activity or interest; and  
7 4 6 3 Section 7(9): providing that information will be provided "in the form in which 
it is sought" unless doing so would contribute to the diversion of resources of the 
public authority.   403
The creation of public awareness about corruption is closely related to the first ele-
ment of measuring public perceptions on corruption. In this instance, however, the 
main focus is to show the public that corruption will not thrive if they do not become 
passive role-players when corruption is being perpetrated.  404
7 4 7 Penalties 
Following Gary Becker's (1968) classic analysis of crime prevention, given the prob-
ability that the perpetrator of a crime would be caught, the penalty imposed plays an 
 Xindex “India: Right to information and privacy ‘two sides of the same coin’” http://www.indexon403 -
censorship.org/2013/09/indias-right-information-act-colliding-privacy/ (Accessed 2014-01-04).
 Masiloane & Dintwe “Developing an Anti-Corruption Strategy for the South African Public Sector” 404
2014 Journal for Public Administration 180 – 198
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important role in determining the probability that criminal or illegal acts would take 
place. In theory, all things being equal, corruption could be reduced by increasing the 
penalties on those who get caught. This analysis implies that the penalty structure 
existing in a country is an important factor in determining the extent of corruption in 
that country.  But once again, at least theoretically, higher penalties may reduce 405
the number of acts of corruption, but they may lead to demands for higher bribes on 
the corrupt acts that still take place. 
According to Lodge , professor of Peace and Conflict Studies in the Department of 406
Politics and Public Administration and dean, Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social 
Sciences at the University of Limerick, with the government’s retreat from the ‘di-
rigiste’ models of public administration favoured under apartheid, the proliferation of 
privatisation and the contracting out of what were exclusively government’s func-
tions, the government’s regulatory functions have expanded rapidly, well beyond its 
administrative capacity. This loophole in the regulation of private work performed for 
government requires an anti-corruption strategy which will make corruption unprof-
itable. It is a tedious and lengthy engagement to investigate corruption, apprehend 
perpetrators and recover the losses suffered by the government and this makes cor-
ruption to be lucrative to the perpetrators. The anti-corruption strategy should contain 
remedial measures which are structured in such a way that the punishment meted 
out to those found guilty of corruption, becomes deterrence to the prospective fraud-
sters. It is therefore submitted that de-incentivising corruption is a hallmark and an 
 Barsukova “Academic Debates and Russian Reality” 2009 Russian Politics and Law 8 - 27.405
 Lodge “Countering public corruption in South Africa” 2001 available at http://archive.lib.msu.edu/406
DMC/African%20journals/pdfs.
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important facet of any anti-corruption strategy.  407
7 4 8 Clarity 
Those who formulate anti-corruption legislation need to ensure clarity and non-ambi-
guity of the law, that it is simple to apply, and that it demands little or no judgment in 
determining its applicability.  Laws written this way are said to contain bright-line 408
rules and are contrasted with those containing standards that are open to interpreta-
tion by enforcement agencies.  When drafting such acts, the instinct is to list every 409
activity that can conceivably be considered corrupt, and to avoid deliberate misinter-
pretation, as people are creative in finding ways to enrich themselves or their friends 
and family at the public’s expense.  410
7 4 9 Examples by leadership 
A final contributing factor is the example provided by leadership. When the top politi-
cal leaders do not provide the right example, either because they engage in acts of 
corruption or, as is more often the case, because they condone such acts on the part 
of relatives, friends or political associates, it cannot be expected that the employees 
in the public administration will behave differently. The same argument applies within 
particular institutions such as tax administration, customs and public enterprises. 
 Masiloane & Dintwe “Developing and Anti-Corruption Strategy for the South African Public Sector” 407
2014 Journal for Public Administration 180 – 198.
 Messick & Kleinfeld “Writing an effective anti-corruption law” 2001 World Bank: Open knowledge 408
Repository https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/9777/multi0page.pdf?
sequence=1.
 Kaplow “Rules versus standards: An economic analysis” 1992 Duke Law Journal 42 (3).409
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These institutions cannot be expected to be corruption free if their heads do not pro-
vide the best examples of honesty.  411
7 4 10 An Adequately Independent Anti-Corruption Unit 
MOGOENG CJ explained “Adequate Independence” in the Glenister case as:  
“The Constitution requires the creation of an adequately independent anti-cor-
ruption unit. It also requires that a member of the Cabinet must be ‘responsible 
for policing’. These constitutional duties can productively co-exist, and will do 
so, provided only that the anti-corruption unit, whether placed within the police 
force (as is the DPCI) or in the NPA (as was the DSO), has sufficient attributes 
of independence to fulfil the functions required of it under the Bill of Rights. The 
member of Cabinet responsible for policing must fulfil that responsibility under 
section 206(1) with due regard to the state’s constitutional obligations under 
section 7(2) of the Constitution.”  412
7 4 11 Sufficient funding for the Anti-Corruption Unit 
The OECD report on a review of models of specialised anti-corruption institutions in-
ternationally notes the following:  
“Adequate funding of a body is of crucial importance. While full financial inde-
pendence cannot be achieved (at minimum the budget will be approved by the 
Parliament and in many cases prepared by the Government), sustainable fund-
 Masiloane & Dintwe “Developing an Anti-Corruption Strategy for the South African Public Sector” 411
2014 Journal for Public Administration 180 – 198.
Helen Suzman Foundation v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others; Glenister v 412
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (CCT 07/14, CCT 09/14) [2014] ZACC 32 (27 
November 2014)
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ing needs to be secured and legal regulations should prevent unfettered discre-
tion of the executive over the level of funding”.  413
After a discussion of the mentioned anti-bribery legislative environments in the 
BRICS, a definition of a “strong legal framework” was explained. This understanding 
can now be used in the South African context and in turn further our economic de-
velopment.  
Therefore, South African law can benefit from a critical comparative analysis of anti-
corruption (in particular anti-bribery) legislation in the other BRICS countries. Using 
and adapting existing laws from the other members of the BRICS group to comple-
ment the South African set of laws, could be to the benefit of all five members of the 
unity and could possibly restore the necessary faith in South African leaders and in 
the country as a growing nation. 
South Africa is seen as a pantry of the future for the growing world population since 
the country’s agricultural possibilities are exceeding these of other countries.  Know-
ing that there is little endurance for and proven control of corruption in South Africa 
may increase the possibilities investments by the greater economies of the world in 
this country at the bottom of Africa. 
 OECD “Specialised Anti-Corruption Institutions – Review of Models” http://www.oecd.org/corrup413 -
tion/acn/specialisedanti-corruptioninstitutions-reviewofmodels.htm.
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